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Abstract
Stream ciphers are cryptographic primitives belonging to symmetric key
cryptography to ensure data confidentiality of messages sent through an inse-
cure communication channel. This thesis presents attacks on several stream
ciphers, especially against their initialization methods.
The first targets are the stream ciphers Salsa20 and Trivium. For both
ciphers slid pairs are described. Salsa20 can be distinguished from a random
function using only the slid pair relation. When a slid pair is given for Salsa20
both secret keys can be recovered immediately if the nonces and counters
are known. Also an efficient search for a hidden slid pair in a large list of
ciphertexts is shown. The efficiency of the birthday attack can be increased
twice using slid pairs. For the cipher Trivium a large related-key class which
produces identical keystreams up to a shift is presented.
Then the resynchronization mechanism of the stream ciphers SNOW 3G
and SNOW 2.0 is analyzed. Both ciphers are simplified by replacing all addi-
tions modulo 232 with XORs. A known IV key-recovery attack is presented
for SNOW 3G⊕ and SNOW 2.0⊕ where both ciphers have no feedback from
the FSM. This attack works for any amount of initialization clocks. Then in
both ciphers the feedback from the FSM is restored and the number of 33 ini-
tialization clocks is reduced. Chosen IV key-recovery attacks on SNOW 3G⊕
with 12 to 16 initialization clocks and SNOW 2.0⊕ with 12 to 18 initialization
clocks are shown.
In a similar way versions of the stream cipher K2 are attacked. This
cipher is simplified by replacing all additions modulo 232 with XORs as
well. Chosen IV key-recovery attacks on versions with reduced initialization
clocks from five to seven out of 24 are presented. For the version with seven
initialization clocks also a chosen IV distinguishing attack is shown.
The last part deals with a linear key-IV setup and known feedback poly-
nomials of the shrinking generator. It is shown that this linear initialization
results in a very weak cipher as only a few known IVs are required to re-
cover the secret key. The original design of the shrinking generator does not
include any initialization method so the initial state was assumed to be the
secret key.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 What is Cryptography?
The notation “cryptography” originates from the Greek words κρυpiτo´ς =
krypto´s which means secret or hidden and γρα´ϕειν = gra´phein which means
writing. Thus, it is the science of secret transmission, encryption, decryption,
code developing, code breaking, etc.
A famous paraphrase of the quintessence of cryptography was given by
a well-known cryptographer:
“Cryptography is about communication in the presence of adversaries.”
Ron Rivest
This describes in a very clear way one of the main goals of cryptography
where two persons want to communicate and hide the shared information
from unwanted persons who can listen to their conversation.
The symmetric-key cryptography deals with the protection of communi-
cation based on Shannon’s model in Figure 1.1.
public channel
key
encryption ciphertext
secret channel
sender
key
decryption
receiver
plaintextplaintext
Figure 1.1: Shannon’s model
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The sender and receiver have access to a secret channel and a public
channel. Messages going through the secret channel can not be monitored,
altered or erased by an adversary. Though the secret channel is limited
in such a way that it is only established at a certain point in time, has a
slow transfer rate, can only handle small messages or has other restrictions.
The public channel is always available without limitations but messages can
be eavesdropped by an intruder. Thus, the sender and receiver have to
use a method to encrypt and decrypt their messages. The sender encrypts
the message called plaintext to a ciphertext using an encryption algorithm
together with a secret key. This key is transmitted via the secret channel
and the ciphertext is sent through the public channel. Then the receiver
uses the same key to decrypt the ciphertext yielding the plaintext and is
able to read the message. The eavesdropper can listen to the ciphertext in
the public channel but he can not recover the original message as he does
not have the right key.
The symmetric-key encryption algorithms can be divided into stream
ciphers, which are the topic of this thesis, and block ciphers. Stream ciphers
encrypt the plaintext one digit at a time whereas block ciphers take a “block”
of plaintext digits at once and encrypt it.
Another branch of cryptography dealing with the protection of communi-
cation is the public-key cryptography. The sender and receiver do not share
the same key anymore. Instead the receiver creates a pair of different keys
with one key kept secret and the other one broadcasted over the public chan-
nel. The so-called public key is used by the sender to encrypt the message
which is transmitted over the public channel. Only the receiver knows the
secret key connected to the public key and can decrypt the message.
There are many other areas of cryptography such as hash functions, dig-
ital signatures, etc., each one invented to achieve another specific goal.
1.2 Security Goals
Over the years the development of cryptography has advanced faster and
faster, especially since the invention of computers and even more with the
growing importance of inter-computer communication. Not only the meth-
ods for cryptography have changed, also the goals for cryptography have
altered to meet the requirements of modern communication systems. Nowa-
days, it is not sufficient anymore to only hide the information of a message
from an unwanted person. In modern cryptography four different security
goals can be distinguished.
Data confidentiality. This is probably the most widespread goal. Two
or more parties want to communicate over an open channel and hide the
information from unwanted persons. This can be done by using a cipher
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to encrypt the message. The sender encrypts a message with a key so that
it usually looks random. Only the receiver who is intended to read the
message and therefore has the right key can decrypt the message and get the
information. Any person who does not have the key should not be able to
get the information from the encrypted message.
User authentication. This goal is also best-known nowadays, since nearly
every electronic device which stores and deals with personal information
requires a password from the user for the login. The identification of the user
to another party which can be another person, a computer or any system
with restricted access can be achieved by proving that he knows a secret
(password, code), owns a unique object (ID card, token) or has a biometric
characteristic (fingerprint, eyes).
Data integrity. With the development of the internet and especially of
e-mail communication and file transfer this goal becomes more and more
important. When a person sends a message or file to another person then
data integrity means that this message is not altered during its way through
the communication channel. One way to ensure integrity is to use a Message
Authentication Code.
Other goals of cryptography are non-repudiation, access control, anonymity,
revocation, certification, timestamping etc.
1.3 Abridgment of Cryptographic History
Although they were probably no form of secret communication, exceptional
hieroglyphs chiseled into ancient Egyptian monuments around 1900 BC can
be considered the first evidence of classic cryptography [CYC06]. In the
sixth century BC Hebrew scholars began to use monoalphabetic substitu-
tion ciphers like Atbash or Albam to replace letters based on their order
in the alphabet [Coh95]. Though questioned by Kelly [Kel98] the Scytale
(σκυτα´λη) usually is considered a cryptographic tool developed in ancient
Greece, supposedly used by Spartan commanders to transmit secret mes-
sages. The first transposition cipher was made possible by winding e.g.,
a strip of parchment around a baton and writing the message onto it (see
Figure 1.2). Once unwound the original text was “unreadable” due to the
rearranged order of the letters and could be decrypted by using a device of
the same diameter.
The probably best-known cipher of ancient history is a substitution ci-
pher known as Caesar Cipher. The additive cipher, that replaced each letter
by another obtained through shifting in the alphabet, was named after the
famous Roman statesman. Concerning the English alphabet each letter is
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Figure 1.2: A parchment wound around a Skytale [Wik07]
substituted by the letter with an additional value of an integer constant c
modulo 26, in the case of Julius Caesar this value was three.
After several centuries lacking noteworthy advances in both cryptography
and cryptanalysis, the first documented description of frequency analysis to
break monoalphabetic substitution ciphers was penned by al-Kindi in the
ninth century AD [Sin99]. In his “Manuscript for the Deciphering Cryp-
tographic Messages” (“Risalah fi Istikhraj al-Mu’amma”) he also provided
cryptanalysis techniques for both mono- and polyalphabetic ciphers.
Another important medieval cryptographer was Leon Battista Alberti,
the author of a treatise on ciphers in 1467 entitled “De Cifris” who was
addressed as the “Father of Western Cryptography” by cryptography histo-
rian David Kahn [Kah67a]. The Italian invented the Alberti Cipher Disk
that allowed a polyalphabetic substitution with mixed alphabets and vari-
able period and thus made frequency analysis ineffective due to the masked
frequency distribution.
In 1586 the French diplomat Blaise de Vigenère took credit for an idea
originally described in the book “La cifra del Sig. Giovan Battista Bel[l]aso”.
In 1553 Bellaso had introduced a method that used a square table, the so-
called “tabula recta”1, and a key termed “countersign” to switch the cipher
alphabets for each letter periodically [Kah67a]. The repetition of the usually
short key was the starting point for attacks, as guessing the right key length
n allowed to split the cipher into n Caesar Ciphers. Nevertheless a version
of this method named Vigenère Cipher was considered indecipherable until
Friedrich Kasiski published a successful general attack on the cipher in his
book “Secret Writing and the Art of Deciphering” (“Die Geheimschriften und
die Dechiffri[e]r-Kunst”) in 1863 [Kas63].2
1The device is also known as Vigenère square or Vigenère table and can be used for
both en- and decryption.
2Charles Babbage might have been the first to break the Vigenère Cipher but Kasiski
was the first cryptanalyst to publish his results.
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The second important publication of the late nineteenth century was
Auguste Kerckhoffs’s article “La Cryptographie Militaire” in 1883 [Ker83]
that contained some pioneering ideas whereof some are still fundamental
for today’s cryptography. A part of this specification known as Kerckhoffs’
principle will be explained in Section 2.1.
The beginning of the twentieth century brought several innovative con-
cepts to the cryptographic world, in fact one of them actually dated back
several years as the basic concept of the One-Time Pad originally was deliv-
ered in 1882 [Bel11]. The cipher whose perfect secrecy was later proven by
Claude E. Shannon is described more detailed in Section 2.1, likewise.
It was World War II to usher in a new era of cryptography. At that time
mechanical and electromechanical devices were frequently used for military
communication and manual techniques only remained in use where these
machines were not suitable. In consequence of these developments the new
century was affected by several fundamental changes. Now it were no longer
the linguists but the mathematicians working on cryptanalysis and thus try-
ing to develop new methods for encryption, too. And due to the complexity
of these new machines the development of elaborate cryptanalysis techniques
became inevitable as manually executed brute force attacks were no longer
feasible.
The Enigma (from the Greek word αι´νιγµαmeaning “riddle”) is probably
the best-known example for these electromechanical machines. The three-
rotor, single-notched Enigma (see Figure 1.3) combined the functionality of
a plugboard and three rotating wheels with further setting options to a the-
oretical amount of 3.3×10114 possible configurations which equates 380 bits.
Even if the architecture of this far most common model was known, there
were still 1.1 × 1023 possible cryptovariables left when trying to determine
the daily key, which is comparable to a 76-bit key [Mil01]. Nevertheless, the
Enigma Code was cracked due to some of its weaknesses, in particular by
exploiting the facts that the plugboard connections were reciprocal3 and no
letter was encrypted to itself [Mah45]. For this purpose the British Govern-
ment Code and Cypher School had recruited scientists at Bletchley Park,
mainly mathematicians like Alan Turing, usually referred to as the “Father
of Computer Science”. With the deployment of Colossus Mark 1 helping to
crack the Enigma Code the digital age had begun in February 1944.
In the late forties Claude E. Shannon published the often-cited article
“A Mathematical Theory of Communication” [Sha48] and the fundamental
paper “Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems” [Sha49]. The latter con-
tained the already mentioned model of communication and the important
proof of the One-Time Pad’s perfect secrecy based on results developed dur-
ing WWII and described in a classified report [Sha45].
3Reciprocity implicates that if a certain state would encrypt O to S it would encrypt
S to O in the same manner.
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Figure 1.3: A three-wheel Enigma machine [Wik05]
After World War II both cryptography and cryptanalysis was almost ex-
clusively studied by military and intelligence until the scientific community
got the chance to participate actively. Two requests for proposals by the
National Bureau of Standards in 1973 and 1974 led to the Data Encryp-
tion Standard (DES) that was developed by researchers of IBM and finally
published as Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) in 1977. DES
and its successors are symmetric-key block ciphers with original DES having
only a 56-bit key due to NSA demands4 contrary to its predecessor Lucifer
already using 128-bit keys [Joh09].
Another moment of high importance in the seventies is known as Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, an algorithm that keeps a shared key secret to out-
siders although the communication to generate this key can be eavesdropped.
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman proposed this innovative method for
distributing keys in their article “New Directions in Cryptography” [DH76].
They proposed an asymmetric algorithm combining a so-called “private key”
that has to be kept secret with a so-called “public key” that can be made
available to anybody and thus especially be communicated via an insecure
channel. By computing the shared key based on exponentiation of a gener-
ator of a group and the utilization of both private and public key the result
4Originally the National Security Agency had even wanted a key length of 48 bits,
presumably for “security reasons”.
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stays exclusive to both participants of the key exchange. Two years later
Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman published an article covering
the same topic presenting a public key cryptography algorithm known as
RSA [RSA78] that also was patented in the United States [RSA83].
Although proven insecure being vulnerable to brute force attacks taking
56 hours in 1998 DES was retained as standard until the Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) became effective as FIPS in May 2002. Six months
earlier the block cipher Rijndael developed by the Belgians Joan Daemen and
Vincent Rijmen had been selected as replacement by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology5. Since then several components developed for
AES have been reused in other cryptography algorithms, amongst them the
S-box and the MixColumns operation which both will appear in this thesis
repeatedly.
1.4 Thesis Outline
Chapter 1 characterizes cryptography in general and gives a description of
its goals. Afterwards an abridgement of the history of cryptography is given.
Chapter 2 states the general concept of a stream cipher. It starts with
defining a cipher and then introduces the well-known one-time pad cipher
which was the motivation for stream ciphers. Afterwards the commonly
used building blocks (LFSR, NLFSR, Boolean function, S-box, FSM) are
explained.
Chapter 3 contains a survey of cryptanalytic attacks. Before describing
several attacks we define the goal of an attack as well as the knowledge of the
attacker and which phase (keystream generation or initialization) he strikes.
The first three chapters are influenced to some extent by some books
[MvOV96, LN97], PhD theses [Arm06, Hel07, Max06, Ekd03, Lan06, Fis08]
and internet sources like Wikipedia [Wik11].
Chapter 4 describes slid pairs for the stream ciphers Salsa20 and Trivium.
Both ciphers are in the final portfolio of the eSTREAM project. Given such
a slid pair for Salsa20 we can recover both secret keys immediately if the
nonces and counters are known. We can also find efficiently a hidden slid
pair in a large list of ciphertexts and recover both unknown keys. The
slid pairs can also be used to increase the efficiency of the birthday attack
twice. For Trivium we show a large related key-class which produces identical
keystreams up to a shift. Our results on slid pairs in Salsa20 and Trivium
are presented in [PSB08].
Chapter 5 presents attacks against simplified versions of the stream cipher
SNOW3G and its predecessor SNOW2.0. The two ciphers are simplified by
replacing all additions modulo 232 with XORs. For both SNOW3G and
SNOW2.0 we show a known IV key-recovery attack without feedback from
5Until 1988 known as National Bureau of Standards.
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the FSM working for any amount of initialization clocks on the one hand and
chosen IV key-recovery attacks on reduced numbers of initialization clocks
on the other hand. Our results on SNOW3G are presented in [BPSZ10].
Chapter 6 describes attacks against simplified versions of the stream ci-
pher K2. The simplification is received by replacing all additions modulo
232 with XORs. We present chosen IV key-recovery attacks on versions with
reduced initialization clocks from five to seven out of 24 initialization clocks
and a chosen IV distinguishing attack on the version with seven initialization
clocks. The attack on the reduced version with five initialization clocks and
the distinguishing attack will appear in [PS11]. The extension of the chosen
IV key-recovery attack to six and seven clocks was obtained later.
Chapter 7 shows that the shrinking generator with a linear key-IV setup
and known feedback polynomials can easily be broken using a few known IVs.
Originally, the shrinking generator was published without any initialization
mode and the initial state was assumed to be the secret key. We studied a
linear initialization with key and IV and known feedback polynomials. In
this case we only needed a few known IVs to receive the secret key. This
work is part of a paper currently under submission.
Chapter 8 gives some final conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are cryptographic primitives belonging to symmetric key ci-
phers. A block cipher in a stream cipher mode can simulate a stream cipher
so why do we need “real” stream ciphers? In the cryptographic community
the opinion prevails that well constructed stream ciphers can have a better
performance and / or smaller hardware requirements then block ciphers in
a stream cipher mode. The eSTREAM project [eST08] confirms that opin-
ion. eSTREAM was a project by ECRYPT [ECR08] to detect new promising
stream ciphers conducted from 2004 to 2008. There are seven stream ciphers
in the final portfolio classified into two profiles, a hardware and a software
profile. The demand for the hardware profile was that stream ciphers must
have less hardware requirements than AES [DR02] whereas the software
profile required a better software performance than AES in a stream cipher
mode.
2.1 Basic Concept of Stream Ciphers
We start with the definition of a symmetric key cipher.
Definition 2.1: A symmetric key cipher is given by three sets
• a finite set of plaintexts P
• a finite set of ciphertexts C
• a finite set of keys K
and two algorithms
• the encryption algorithm E with E : K × P → C
• the decryption algorithm D with D : K × C → P
with the property D(k, E(k, p)) = p for each k ∈ K and all p ∈ P.
A fundamental principle which should guide the construction of a cipher
is Kerckhoffs’ principle [Ker83] which states that a cipher should be secure
even if everything except the key is known to the attacker. Thus, the security
11
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of a cipher should not rely on the secrecy of the algorithm rather on a secret
key. A key can be kept secure much easier than a whole system, which might
be used by several parties and / or implemented on several devices, and a key
can easily be changed if it is jeopardized or revealed.
The well-known one-time pad cipher illustrates this principle in an im-
pressive manner since everything except the secret key is known to the at-
tacker. The one-time pad is an advancement of the Vernam cipher [Ver26].
Vernam did not insist on a random key as according to the text of U.S. Patent
1,310,719 [Ver19] he left the choice to the users but suggested the key to be
“[. . . ] preferably selected at random [. . . ]”. Mauborgne [Kah67b] identified
the advantage that an endless and senseless key would make the cryptanaly-
sis more difficult. The one-time pad is a Vernam cipher with completely
random keys which are used only once.
Definition 2.2: The one-time pad is a cipher with the following properties:
• the key is completely random
• the key is at least as long as the plaintext
• each key is used only once for encryption.
As encryption function the XOR or a modulo addition can be used. Ta-
ble 2.1 gives an example of the encryption with the one-time pad. A number
from 0 to 25 is dedicated each letter of the alphabet, e.g., a=0, b=1, . . . ,
z=25. Then the encryption function is the addition modulo 26.
Plaintext:
t h i s i s m y t e x t t o e n c r y p t
19 7 8 18 8 18 12 24 19 4 23 19 19 14 4 13 2 17 24 15 19
Encryption with random key:
h k o r o m g i g c w b z f l x w v q m y
+ 7 10 14 17 14 12 6 8 6 2 22 1 25 5 11 23 22 21 16 12 24
Ciphertext:
a r w j w e s g z g t u s t p k y m o b r
= 0 17 22 9 22 4 18 6 25 6 19 20 18 19 15 10 24 12 14 1 17
Table 2.1: Example for encryption with the one-time pad
In 2011 Bellovin [Bel11] discovered that Frank Miller invented the one-
time pad 35 years earlier. The one-time pad was proven to be uncondition-
ally secure by Shannon [Sha49]. Unconditionally secure means that even an
attacker with unlimited resources (computing power, time, memory require-
ments, etc.) is unable to recover the unknown plaintext or the secret key
from a ciphertext. This advantage of a security proof is confronted with the
fact that this cipher is infeasible for most practical applications. The con-
stant need of truly random keys is a problem as the generation of random
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keys is extensive due to a required source of true randomness (for example
radioactive decay). Also the safe storage or transmission of the secret keys
which are at least as long as the plaintexts is difficult.
This is the motivation for stream ciphers which take a short secret key
and produce long pseudo-random sequences, so-called keystreams, to encrypt
the plaintexts. Thus, stream ciphers only imitate the one-time pad, the
unconditional security does not hold anymore. Instead, the security of stream
ciphers is described as conditionally secure which means that in principle the
cipher can be broken but the attacker would need an unrealistic amount of
resources (computing power, time or memory requirements, etc.).
The simplest way to break a stream cipher is the brute force attack where
the attacker exhaustively tries all keys until he has found the right one. The
complexity of this exhaustive key search is based on the amount of possible
keys. With an increasing amount of potential keys the complexity grows
exponentially. Therefore, the quantity of possible keys should be big enough
to make the brute force attack infeasible in practice. Consequently, a stream
cipher is called secure if no attack exists with a smaller complexity than the
brute force attack.
The algorithm to compute the keystream is called a keystream generator.
Definition 2.3: A KeyStream Generator (KSG) is a Finite State Machine
(FSM) which consists of
• a finite set of keys K
• a finite set of keystreams Z
• an internal state S
• an update function g( )
• an output function f( ).
First the FSM is loaded with the key. Then for each clock the update function
updates the internal state and the output function produces the element of
the keystream.
Definition 2.4: A stream cipher is a symmetric key cipher which encrypts
the elements of the plaintext one at a time. It consists of a KSG which gener-
ates the keystream and a combining function which combines the keystream
and the plaintext elements.
The combining function is usually an XOR but also the modulo addition
is used. Stream ciphers are typically classified into synchronous and self-
synchronizing ones but there are also stream ciphers which do not belong to
any of these categories, for example Phelix [WSLM05] which has a built-in
message authentication code functionality.
Definition 2.5: A synchronous stream cipher generates the keystream in-
dependently from the previous ciphertext elements.
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The notation “synchronous” means that the sender and receiver must be
synchronized for a successful decryption. If a ciphertext element is deleted
or inserted during its way through the communication channel then synchro-
nization is lost and all the following ciphertext elements can not be decrypted
correctly. If a ciphertext element is modified only the corresponding plain-
text element is changed and no other plaintext elements are affected. Such a
modification of one element might not be detected. Message authentication
is needed to prevent both incidents.
Definition 2.6: In a self-synchronizing (asynchronous) cipher a fixed num-
ber of previous ciphertext elements are involved in the keystream generation.
The notation “self-synchronizing” means that the cipher will synchronize
itself after a fixed number of ciphertexts if an error occurs.
Stream ciphers must use a new random key for each new plaintext. As
described, the generation of random keys is expensive so the designers looked
for a possibility to use one key for more than one plaintext. The solution is
the use of an initial value (IV) in addition to the key. Nearly all new cipher
constructions use a key together with an IV. This IV is typically publicly
known and should be a random nonce (number used once) or a counter. The
combination of the same key and IV together must never be used again.
An initialization phase is needed to have a proper mixing of the unknown
key and the known IV before the keystream is produced. This initialization
phase should be non-linear, unequal if procurable to the update function
used during the keystream generation as well as long enough to counteract
attacks against the initialization method. Figure 2.1 shows a synchronous
stream cipher which takes a key and an IV to produce the keystream.
key
internal keystream
plaintext ciphertext
update
function
output
function
combining
function
initialization
IV
state
Figure 2.1: Synchronous stream cipher with key and IV
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2.2 Building Blocks
Stream ciphers can be constructed in many different ways. We describe the
widely used building blocks. There are several other constructions.
2.2.1 Linear Feedback Shift Register
One of the most frequently used building block of stream ciphers is the Linear
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). It is a FSM operating on some finite field
Fq. This finite field is often a binary field with q = 2 or an extension of the
binary field with q = 2e where 1 < e ∈ N. The register consists of a number
of cells which gives the length of the register denoted with l. Each cell can
contain one element of Fq. The content of the register is called the state
and the content at the beginning of the computation is called initial state or
starting state. Figure 2.2 shows a picture of an LFSR.
s0
c0
s1
c1c2
s2
. . .
. . .
. . .
cl−2
sl−2sl−1
cl−1cl
Figure 2.2: General composition of a Linear Feedback Shift Register
When the LFSR is clocked (the time is denoted with t) the content of
the last (rightmost) cell becomes the output, for all other cells the content
is shifted one cell to the right and the content of the first (leftmost) cell is
computed via the linear recurrence relation
st+l = cl ·
l−1∑
i=0
ci · st+i c0, c1, . . . cl ∈ Fq
where all computations are done in Fq. The constants c0, c1, . . . , cl are the
feedback coefficients with c0 6= 0 and cl 6= 0. The so-called tap positions are
the connections at ci 6= 0 for i = 0, . . . , l−1 and the connection at cl is called
the feedback position.
Definition 2.7: The feedback polynomial of an LFSR is the polynomial
g(x) = clx0 − cl−1x1 − · · · − c0xl
in the ring of polynomials Fq[x].
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There are some important properties which the feedback polynomial must
fulfil in order to achieve a long period.
Definition 2.8: A polynomial g(x) ∈ Fq[x] with degree l is called irreducible
if it can not be factored into two polynomials with positive degrees smaller
than l in Fq.
Definition 2.9: An irreducible polynomial g(x) ∈ Fq[x] with degree l is
called primitive if it divides the polynomial xql−1 − 1 but no polynomial
xu − 1 with u < ql − 1.
Theorem 2.10: If an LFSR has a primitive feedback polynomial g(x) ∈
Fq[x] with degree l, then the period of the LFSR is T = ql − 1 for every
non-zero starting state.
For the proof we refer to [LN97].
Therefore, an LFSR with a primitive feedback polynomial is called a
maximum length LFSR and its sequence is called maximum length sequence.
Definition 2.11: The linear complexity of a sequence s = s0, s1, . . . , si ∈
Fq, denoted with LC(s), is the length of the shortest LFSR that can generate
this sequence.
If the sequence s is the all-zero sequence then LC(s) = 0. If the sequence
s is truly random then LC(s) = ∞ because no LFSR can produce such a
sequence.
The Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [Mas69] can efficiently find the shortest
LFSR for a sequence s and hence its linear complexity if at least 2LC(s)
elements of s are given.
2.2.2 Non-Linear Feedback Shift Register
One solution to solve the linearity problem of an LFSR is the usage of a
Non-Linear Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR). It is built in the same way
as an LFSR but the feedback function is non-linear. Thus, it preserves the
advantage to be easily implemented. In addition, NLFSRs have high linear
complexity which makes the execution of algebraic attacks much harder or
infeasible. One disadvantage is that balancedness is hard to achieve. Another
problem is the little knowledge of the mathematical background of NLFSRs
contrary to LFSRs. Thus, no general criteria for maximum periods or good
statistical properties are known.
2.2.3 Boolean Function
Definition 2.12: A Boolean function is a mapping f : Fn2 → F2
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = y with x1, x2, . . . , xn, y ∈ F2.
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There are 22n different Boolean functions with n input variables. We
denote this set of Boolean functions with Bn. Boolean functions can be
represented in different ways.
Definition 2.13: The truth table (TT) of a Boolean function f ∈ Bn is a
binary string of length 2n
TT (f) = [f(0, 0, . . . , 0), f(1, 0, . . . , 0), f(0, 1, . . . , 0), . . . , f(1, 1, . . . , 1)] .
The truth table is the easiest way if the number n of inputs is not too
big.
Definition 2.14: The algebraic normal form (ANF) of a Boolean function
f ∈ Bn is a polynomial over F2
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = c0 ⊕
⊕
1≤i≤n
cixi ⊕
⊕
1≤i<j≤n
cijxixj ⊕ · · · ⊕ c12...nx1x2 . . . xn
with the coefficients c0, . . . , cn, c12, . . . , c12...n ∈ F2.
This representation as a polynomial is unique.
Definition 2.15: Let f ∈ Bn and x,w ∈ F2 with x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and
w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) and x ·w = x1w1⊕x2w2⊕· · ·⊕xnwn. Then the Walsh
transform of f(x) is a real valued function over Fn2 defined as
Wf (w) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)⊕x·w .
The Walsh spectrum is the integer valued vector Wf .
For cryptographic use some properties like algebraic degree, balanced-
ness, non-linearity, correlation immunity, algebraic immunity are important.
Definition 2.16: The algebraic degree of f ∈ Bn denoted as deg(f) is the
number of variables in the highest order term with a non-zero coefficient in
the ANF.
Definition 2.17: A function f ∈ Bn is called affine if it has no term with
degree > 1 in the ANF. The set of all affine functions with n input variables
is denoted as An. A function f ∈ An is called linear if it has a constant
term equal to zero.
For some properties we need the Hamming weight and the Hamming
distance so we define them as well.
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Definition 2.18: The Hamming weight of a binary sequence s denoted as
wH(s) is the number of ones in s. For two binary sequences s1 and s2 with
the same length the Hamming distance denoted as dH(s1, s2) is the number
of positions where both sequences differ. Thus, the equation dH(s1, s2) =
wH(s1 ⊕ s2) holds.
Definition 2.19: A function f ∈ Bn is called balanced if its truth table has
an equal number of ones and zeros, i.e.,
wH(TT (f)) = 2n−1 ⇔ Wf (0) = 0 .
Definition 2.20: The non-linearity of f ∈ Bn denoted as nl(f) is the mini-
mum distance to the set An, i.e.,
nl(f) = min
g∈An
(dH(f, g)) ⇔ nl(f) = 2n−1 − 12 maxw∈Fn2
|Wf (w)| .
Definition 2.21: A function f ∈ Bn is called mth order correlation immune
(CI) if and only if its Walsh transform satisfies
Wf (w) = 0 ∀ w with 1 ≤ wH(w) ≤ m .
If f is also balanced then it is called m-resilient.
Definition 2.22: The algebraic immunity for a function f ∈ Bn denoted as
AI(f) is the minimum degree of g ∈ Bn with f · g = 0 or (f ⊕ 1) · g = 0.
2.2.4 S-box
A Substitution Box (S-box) is a mapping f : Fn2 → Fm2 . It substitutes a
vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn2 by a vector y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ Fm2 in a
non-linear manner. The mapping f can be divided intom Boolean functions.
Then we can write y = f(x) as
y1 = f1(x1, x2, . . . , xn),
y2 = f2(x1, x2, . . . , xn),
...
ym = fm(x1, x2, . . . , xn).
Therefore, the S-box can be defined by the truth tables or the ANF of its
Boolean functions. The Boolean functions are also used to define some prop-
erties of the S-box.
Definition 2.23: An S-box f = (f1, f2, . . . , fm) is balanced if all non-zero
linear combinations of its Boolean functions are balanced.
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Definition 2.24: The algebraic degree of an S-box f is defined as the mini-
mum algebraic degree of all non-zero linear combinations of its Boolean func-
tions, i.e.
deg(f) = min
(c1,c2,...,cm)∈Fm2 \{0}
deg
(
m∑
i=1
cifi
)
.
Definition 2.25: The non-linearity of an S-box f is defined as minimum
non-linearity of all non-zero linear combinations of its Boolean functions, i.e.
nl(f) = min
(c1,c2,...,cm)∈Fm2 \{0}
nl
(
m∑
i=1
cifi
)
.
There are two kinds of S-boxes, static ones and varying ones. The static
S-box is just a fixed mapping which can be designed to have special properties
and which is assumed to be known to the attacker. The varying S-box is key
dependent and thus varies during the computation.
The design of good S-boxes is a difficult task. This might be the rea-
son why a good S-box is often reused by designers of other ciphers, for
example the 8-bit to 8-bit S-box of the AES block cipher [DR02]. The in-
put is mapped to its multiplicative inverse in the finite field, followed by an
affine transformation. Amongst others, the stream ciphers SNOW2.0 [EJ02],
SNOW3G [ETS06a] and K2 [KTS07] use this S-box.
2.2.5 Finite State Machine
The main intention of using a Finite State Machine (FSM) is to increase non-
linearity in a stream cipher construction. Usually an FSM is used together
with one or more LFSRs. It consists of some extra memory and a non-linear
update function. A non-linear operation is mostly more expensive then a
linear operation. Thus, stream ciphers have to find a tradeoff between a
large state which can be updated fast and easily and non-linearity. The
FSM is one solution for this problem. A typical construction of an FSM has
some memory cells which are updated by S-boxes and one or more inputs
from the LSFR(s). The output produced by the FSM is combined with
the output of the LFSR(s) to yield the keystream. During the initialization
phase the output of the FSM is often fed back in the LFSR(s) to achieve a
non-linear initialization phase and a non-linear state of the LFSR(s).
2.2.6 Additional Components
The previously described building blocks need to be connected to result in a
stream cipher construction. Nowadays, usually non-linear functions are used
to combine several building blocks and to compute the keystream.
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The non-linear combining function uses the output of several (N)LFSRs
to compute the output of the stream cipher in a non-linear way, whereas
the non-linear filter function uses several elements of only one (N)LFSR to
compute the output of the stream cipher in a non-linear way. Figure 2.3
shows both functions which are usually Boolean functions if Fq = F2.
The irregular clocking is another method used to increase the non-linearity.
There are different kinds of irregular clocking. One uses the outputs or some
elements of one or more (N)LFSRs to determine when and how often which
of the (N)LFSRs are clocked. An example is the A5/1 algorithm [BGW99]
where for each cycle two or three out of its three registers are clocked. An-
other way to achieve an irregular clocking is the use of regular clocked
(N)LFSR(s) but decimate the output yielding a keystream with unknown
clocking decisions. Two examples for such a decimation are the shrinking
generator [CKM93] and the self-shrinking generator [MS94].
This enumeration is far from being complete as there are many more
elements and / or methods to build a stream cipher.
non-linear combining function
f
f
(N)LFSR 2
zt
...
(N)LFSR n
non-linear filter function
(N)LFSR(N)LFSR 1
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Figure 2.3: Two functions to increase non-linearity
2.3 Stream Ciphers Analyzed in this Thesis
All ciphers analyzed in this thesis are synchronous stream ciphers which use
a key together with an IV except for the last cipher.
Our first topic is Salsa20 [Ber05], a stream cipher inspired by a block
cipher in counter mode. It consists of a 4×4 -matrix of 32-bit words together
with a non-linear update function. This cipher has no initialization phase.
The keystream is produced by loading the key, a nonce and a counter in
the matrix and performing the update function several times. As long as
keystream is needed this procedure is repeated with an increased counter.
The second stream cipher named Trivium [dCP05] is a simple but ele-
gant design of one NLFSR over F2 with three non-linear update functions
having three different feedback positions and a linear filter function for the
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keystream computation. The update of the internal state during the initial-
ization phase of 4 ·288 clocks is the same as during the keystream generation.
The ciphers Salsa20 and Trivium are analyzed in Chapter 4.
Both SNOW [EJ02, ETS06a] ciphers use an LFSR with sixteen 32-bit
words, an FSM containing either three memory words connected with two
S-boxes or two memory words connected with one S-box and a non-linear
keystream function. After loading the key and IV in the LFSR both ciphers
perform an initialization phase of 32 clocks where the output of the FSM is
fed back in the LFSR resulting in a non-linear initialization phase. Then both
ciphers switch to the keystream generation phase but the first keystream
word is discarded. Key-recovery attacks on simplified versions with and
without feedback from the FSM in the LFSR during the initialization are
presented in Chapter 5.
The next cipher named K2 [KTS07] is special as it uses a dynamic feed-
back controller which dynamically chooses between four different linear feed-
back functions for one FSR consisting of eleven 32-bit words. The other
building blocks are another FSR of five 32-bit words, an FSM with four
memory words and four S-boxes as well as a non-linear keystream function
combining words from all three building blocks to produce two keystream
words each clock. During the initialization phase the two keystream words
are fed back in the FSRs one in each. Key-recovery attacks as well as a
distinguishing attack on simplified versions are shown in Chapter 6.
The last one is the shrinking generator [CKM93], an old design which
uses two LFSRs over F2 where the output bit of the first LFSR decides
whether the output bit of the second LFSR becomes the keystream bit or
is discarded. This construction is given without any key-IV loading or ini-
tialization method. Thus the initial states are assumed to be the secret key
which sometimes includes the feedback polynomials of the LFSRs, too. A
version with a linear key-IV setup and known feedback polynomials is stud-
ied in Chapter 7.
In this chapter we gave some basics about stream ciphers. We introduced
the one-time pad and its relation to stream ciphers. This is followed by a
short overview of the most used building blocks. We also gave a classification
of the stream ciphers analyzed in this thesis. In the next chapter we will give
a survey of attacks applicable to stream ciphers.
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Chapter 3
Survey of Attacks
Prior to the description of different attacks on stream ciphers we have to
define the goal of an attack, the knowledge of the attacker and which phase
(initialization or keystream generation) the attacker strikes.
There are two main goals in attacking a stream cipher. The more im-
portant one is to recover the secret key. Consequently, an attack with this
goal is called a key recovery attack. The other goal is to distinguish the key-
stream computed by the stream cipher from a truly random stream. These
attacks are called distinguishing attacks. A key recovery attack is much more
dangerous as the attacker is able to decrypt all ciphertexts which were en-
crypted with this key. If an attacker can recover the secret key he can also
distinguish the produced keystream from a random stream. There are also
other goals possible, for example state recovery.
The knowledge of an attacker can be divided into four categories. In a
ciphertext only attack he knows only the ciphertext. The known plaintext
attack gives the attacker access to known plaintext as well as the correspond-
ing ciphertext. In the stream cipher case this means that the attacker knows
the keystream. In a chosen plaintext attack the attacker is allowed to choose
the plaintexts and get the ciphertexts. The other way around works the
chosen ciphertext attack where the attacker chooses the ciphertexts and gets
the decrypted plaintexts. It is also possible that the attacker has additional
knowledge, for example that two keys are related somehow.
As most stream ciphers execute an initialization phase before they pro-
duce the keystream the attacker can decide which of these two phases he likes
to strike. The attacks on the initialization phase can be divided into known
IV attacks and chosen IV attacks depending on whether the attacker only
knows the IVs or is able to choose them. An attack on the keystream phase
usually assumes a known-keystream scenario (i.e. known plaintext attack).
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3.1 Brute Force Attack
This kind of attack is always possible as the attacker can always try all
potential keys exhaustively. He does not exploit any weakness the stream
cipher might have. As mentioned in Section 2.1 the complexity is based
on the amount of possible keys and grows exponentially with an increasing
amount of possible keys. If keys of size n bits are used then the amount of
possible keys is 2n which leads to 2n attempts to find the right key. The
complexity of the brute force attack is only an upper bound because the
search for the right key can be parallelized.
3.2 Time/Memory Tradeoffs
Time/memory tradeoff attacks on stream ciphers have been independently
described by Babbage [Bab95] and Golic [Gol97] adapting Hellman’s preced-
ing work on block ciphers [Hel80]. Their results were improved by Biryukov
and Shamir [BS00].
Usually, the attacks are based on the findings of the birthday paradox
stating the astonishingly high probability of two persons of a relatively small
group having the same birthday – in a group of 23 people the probability
is 50.7% that this phenomenon occurs. The time/memory tradeoff attack
consists of two phases, a preprocessing phase and a real-time phase. During
the first phase the general structure of the cipher is analyzed and the results
are collected in large tables. In the second phase the preparatory work is
used in connection with data produced from a particular unknown key to
recover it. Thus, the attack can be regarded as a brute force attack on a
smaller key space.
3.3 Correlation Attacks
An important kind of attacks are correlation attacks. They were introduced
by Siegenthaler [Sie84, Sie85] and target stream ciphers which combine sev-
eral LFSRs with a non-linear Boolean function to compute the keystream
bit. These attacks use linear correlations between the keystream bits and the
output bits of one or a small number of LFSRs to recover the secret key. If
the stream cipher consists of n LFSRs each having length li with i = 1, . . . n
then the brute force attack would need
∏n
i=1 2
li tries to recover the initial
states of the LFSRs and thus the secret key. With correlations between the
keystream and single LFSRs the initial states of the LFSRs can be recovered
one by one which would need only
∑n
i=1 2
li tries which is a huge step down.
The correlation immunity of a Boolean function can be computed via the
Walsh transform. If a function is mth order correlation immune then m+ 1
LFSRs must be considered together.
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The approach to approximate the keystream by a linear combination of
the output of some LFSRs is related to coding theory. The keystream is
considered as a polluted linear combination of the output bits of the LFSRs.
Therefore, methods from coding theory have been used to improve correla-
tion attacks [MG90, Pen96].
Fast correlation attacks [MS89, CS91, JJ99, JJ00] not only use weak-
nesses in the Boolean functions but also exploit the linearity of the LFSRs’
update functions. These attacks search during a preprocessing step for par-
ity check equations and use them in the processing step to recover the initial
state of the LFSRs.
3.4 Differential Cryptanalysis
Biham and Shamir [BS90] introduced the differential cryptanalysis in 1990.
The main target for differential attacks are block ciphers but this method
can also be used to attack hash functions and stream ciphers. The idea is
to find differences in the plaintext so that the differences in the ciphertext
have some recognizable characteristics. For stream ciphers the differences
are placed in the IV and the keystream is checked for special differences.
Depending on the capabilities of the attacker we can talk about known or
chosen IV attacks. The goal of differential attacks is either to distinguish
the keystream from a random function or to recover the key. Typically
the differences are computed via an XOR. The differences in the IVs are
traced through the clocks of the initialization phase. For all linear building
blocks the differences can be calculated directly. For the non-linear parts the
probability that a given input difference leads to a special output difference
must be computed. In the case of an S-box the behavior of the differences
can be represented by its difference distribution table. This table of size
2n × 2m contains as rows the input differences and as columns the output
differences. At the intersection of a row and a column is a number which
shows how often this input difference results in this output difference. The
differential attacks on stream ciphers have been studied in [ALP04].
3.5 Algebraic Attacks
The general idea for algebraic attacks is to model the known keystream as a
system of equations in the unknown key variables and then solve this system
to derive the secret key. The idea for such a method was brought up by
Shannon [Sha49].
A system of linear equations can be solved quite easily using Gaussian
elimination whereas the general solution of a system of non-linear equations
over a finite field is an NP-complete problem.
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There are several methods to solve systems of non-linear equations. The
easiest one to solve a system of non-linear equations is to replace each
monomial with a degree higher than one by a new variable which is treated
independently from the already existing ones. The result is a system where
all equations are linear but the number of variables has increased consider-
ably. So the bottleneck is to get enough linear independent equations that
Gaussian elimination is applicable, more precisely the number of equations
should be greater or equal to the number of variables.
Another widely-used technique is Buchberger’s algorithm [Buc65] which
computes Gröbner bases to solve a system of non-linear equations. The
theory of Gröbner bases is also used by Faugère who developed the algorithms
F4 [Fau99] and F5 [Fau02]. These algorithms are the most efficient methods
known so far to solve non-linear equations over a finite field. The drawback
for the algorithms based on Gröbner bases is the difficult estimation of the
complexity.
An algorithm to solve an overdefined system of quadratic equations over
F2 was presented by Kipnis and Shamir [KS99]. This relinearization algo-
rithm was analyzed and strengthen by Courtois et al. [CKPS00] to handle
higher degree multivariate systems. This improved version was called XL
algorithm where XL comes from eXtended Linearization was used to attack
the stream cipher Toyocrypt [Cou02]. The criteria for success and complex-
ity of the XL algorithm are unsettled as well as for another improvement the
XSL algorithm [CP02].
In 2003 two papers [CM03, AK03] started a surge on research on alge-
braic attacks. One year later, Meier et al. [MPC04] introduced the algebraic
immunity of a Boolean function which was a generalization of [CM03].
Definition 3.1: The algebraic immunity of a Boolean function f , denoted
with AI(f), is the smallest degree of a Boolean function g which satisfies
g · f = 0 or g · (f ⊕ 1) = 0 .
Then the function g is called an annihilator for f .
An algorithm to find the algebraic immunity for a Boolean function f
with n variables is also presented in [MPC04]. The algorithm runs with
a complexity of O((nd )
3) with d being the algebraic immunity. Two years
later Armknecht et al. [ACG+06] gave an improved algorithm with complex-
ity O((nd )
2). A lot of research concerning algebraic attacks and algebraic
immunity followed (e.g., [BL05, DGM05, Car06, FM07]).
Fast algebraic attacks are an extension of algebraic attacks and were
introduced by Courtois [Cou03] and improved by Armknecht [Arm04]. The
idea is to reduce the degree of the system of equations in a precomputation
step by eliminating all high degree monomials which are independent of the
keystream bits.
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Carlet and Feng [CF08] showed an infinitive class of Boolean functions
with good properties regarding balancedness, non-linearity, algebraic immu-
nity and immunity against fast algebraic attacks.
3.6 Cube Attacks
A very new kind of attack are cube attacks introduced in 2009 by Dinur
and Shamir [DS09]. They consider the stream cipher as a tweakable poly-
nomial in the public variables coming from the IV and the secret variables
coming from the key. The attacker is allowed to tweak the polynomial by
choosing different values for the public variables. During a precomputation
step several systems of equations with low degree are constructed by varying
the public variables for all possible values. Then these systems are solved
to get the solution in the secret variables following the secret key. Cube
attacks are the currently best known attack against Trivium [DS09] and
Grain-128 [DS11].
3.7 Side-Channel Attacks
Instead of looking for weaknesses of algorithms with cryptanalysis, side-
channel attacks exploit leaked information gained from the physical imple-
mentation of cryptographic devices. Side-channel attack can be divided into
two categories passive attacks, which only monitor the behavior of the de-
vices performing a cryptographic computation, and active attacks, which try
to influence the device during the computation by physical means to cause
errors or irregular behavior. Active attacks are usually called fault attacks.
Passive attacks can observe different sources of side-channel information.
Timing attacks are based on data dependent differences in execution
time measured while a computation occurs. Kocher [Koc96] explained how
to analyze timing information on various public key algorithms, amongst
others Diffie-Hellman [DH76] and RSA [RSA78]. Differences in processing
zeros and ones permit correlation analyses and hence the discovery of the
secret key.
Power monitoring attacks or power analyses utilize slight variations in
power consumption of the operating hardware for the retrieval of informa-
tion. Kocher et al. [KJJ99] describe two approaches. In a simple power
analysis (SPA) the power trace of a cryptographic device is observed over
time, allowing to identify specific mathematical operations and even the key.
A differential power analysis (DPA) uses statistical methods for the inter-
pretation of these measurement results. By involving signal processing and
error correction functions e.g., to filter out noise, relevant information can
be extracted even better than with SPA.
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Electromagnetic attacks take advantage of electromagnetic waves that
are emanated by electronic devices and hence are comparable to the power
analysis. When the methods described above are adapted to the exploitation
of electromagnetic radiation, they are called SEMA or DEMA [Rec04].
There also exist further forms of attacks like acoustic attacks that make
use of the sounds emitted e.g., by CPUs or thermal imaging attacks based
on infrared images of a processor.
The countermeasures for side-channel attacks are as diverse as the attacks
themselves. To prevent timing attacks, the duration of data dependent op-
erations can be changed e.g., by equalization of computation time depending
on the data to process or inserting random delays. In general, the masking
or blinding of data is suitable to counteract multiple forms of side-channel
attacks. To avoid these attacks the conditional execution paths for the pro-
cessed data must not depend on secret but on public information.
In this chapter we gave a survey of existing attacks against stream ci-
phers. This list is far from being complete several other techniques exist.
Chapter 4
Slid Pairs in Salsa20 and
Trivium
In 2005 Bernstein [Ber05] submitted the stream cipher Salsa20 to the
eSTREAM project [eST08]. Original Salsa20 has 20 rounds, later 8 and
12 rounds versions Salsa20/8 and Salsa20/12 were also proposed. Now
Salsa20/12 is in the software profile in the eSTREAM portfolio. It has a
512-bit state which is initialized by copying into it a 128- or a 256-bit key, a
64-bit nonce and counter and a 128-bit constant. Previous attacks on Salsa
used differential cryptanalysis exploiting a truncated differential over three
or four rounds. The first attack was presented by Crowley [Cro06] which
could break the 5 round version of Salsa20 within claimed 2165 trials. Later,
a four round differential was exploited by Fischer et al. [FMB+06] to break
6 rounds in 2177 trials and by Tsnunoo et al. [TSK+07] to break 7 rounds in
about 2190 trials. The currently best attack by Aumasson et al. [AFK+08]
covers an 8 round version of Salsa20 with an estimated complexity of 2251.
The stream cipher Trivium was submitted by de Cannière and Pre-
neel [dCP05] to the eSTREAM project [eST08] in 2005. Analog to Salsa20/12
Trivium is in the eSTREAM portfolio, even though it is in the hardware pro-
file. Trivium uses an 80-bit key and an 80-bit initial value (IV) to generate
up to 264 bits of keystream. This synchronous cipher has a state size of 288
bits. The interesting part of Trivium is the non-linear update function of
second degree. In [Rad06] Raddum presented and attacked simplified ver-
sions of Trivium called Bivium but the attack on Trivium had a complexity
higher than the exhaustive key search. Bivium was completely broken by
Maximov and Biryukov [MB07] and an attack on Trivium with complexity
about 2100 was presented which showed that the key size of Trivium can
not be increased just by loading longer keys into the state. In [MCP07],
McDonald et al. attacked Bivium using SatSolvers. Another approach that
gained attention recently is to reduce the key setup of Trivium as done by
Turan and Kara [TK07] with 288 initialization rounds and Vielhaber [Vie07]
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with 576 initialization rounds. Fischer, Khazaei and Meier [FKM08] showed
an attack with complexity 255 on a version with 672 initialization rounds.
The best attack for Trivium known so far is the cube attack published by
Dinur and Shamir [DS09] which can break a version with 767 initialization
rounds with time complexity 245. So far, no attack faster than an exhaustive
key search was shown for Trivium with full 1152 initialization rounds. A
summary of attacks on Trivium is given in Table 4.1.
Attack complexity
authors
linearization technique to reduce the quadratic system c · 283.5
factor c to solve the system of linear equations
Maximov and Biryukov [MB07]
linear approximation with bias 2−31
288 initialization rounds
Turan and Kara [TK07]
algebraic IV differential attack negligible
576 initialization rounds, 47 recovered key bits
Vielhaber [Vie07]
chosen IV statistical analysis key-recovery attack 255
672 initialization rounds
Fischer, Khazei and Meier [FKM08]
cube attack 245
767 initialization rounds
Dinur and Shamir [DS09]
Table 4.1: Attacks on Trivium
In this chapter we show a sliding property for the stream ciphers Salsa20
and Trivium. Slide attacks were introduced by Biryukov and Wagner [BW99,
BW00] mainly to attack block ciphers but the method is applicable on stream
ciphers as well.
We start with our investigation of Salsa20 followed by a description of
the attacks. We show that the following observation holds: Suppose that two
black boxes are given, one with Salsa20 and one with a random mapping.
The attacker is allowed to choose a relation F for a pair of inputs, after
which a secret initial input x is chosen and a pair (x,F(x)) is encrypted
either by Salsa20 or by a random mapping. We stress that only the relation
F is known to the attacker and no restrictions are made on the initial input.
The goal of the attacker is given a pair of ciphertexts to tell whether they
were encrypted by Salsa20 or by a random mapping. It is clear that for a
truly random mapping no useful relation F would exist. In contrast, Salsa20
can easily be distinguished from random if F is a carefully selected function
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related to the round-structure of Salsa20. If the initial input satisfies the
Salsa20 conditions (secret key and known nonce, counter and constant), it
is not only a distinguishing but also a complete key-recovery attack. To
give the attacker a hard time the pair may be hidden in a large collection
of other ciphertexts. For a random function there is no way of checking a
large list except for checking all the pairs or doing a birthday attack. We
describe for Salsa20 how to find such a hidden pair in a large list efficiently.
Our attacks are independent of the number of rounds in Salsa and thus work
for all three versions of Salsa. We also show a general birthday attack on
256-bit key Salsa20 with complexity 2192 which can be further sped up twice
using sliding observations. Although as Bernstein [Ber08] mentioned there
are better attacks on Salsa20 using parallelization, we wanted to point out
that the sliding property is useful is this general birthday attack scenario.
In the second part of this chapter we describe our results on Trivium
which show a large related key class (239 out of 280 keys) which produce
identical keystreams up to a shift. We solve the resulting non-linear sliding
equations using Magma and present several examples of such slid key-IV
pairs. The interesting observation is that 24 key bits do not appear in the
equations for a shift of 111 clocks and thus for a fixed IV, there is a 224
freedom of choice for the key that the key-IV pair may have a sliding property.
4.1 Slid Pairs in Salsa20
In this section the symbol “+” denotes the addition modulo 232, the other
two symbols work at the level of the bits with “⊕” as XOR-addition and
“≪” as a shift of bits.
4.1.1 Brief Description of Salsa20
The Salsa20 encryption function uses the Salsa20 core function in a counter
mode. The internal state of Salsa20 is a 4× 4 -matrix of 32-bit words which
is denoted by
Y =

y0 y1 y2 y3
y4 y5 y6 y7
y8 y9 y10 y11
y12 y13 y14 y15
 .
A so-called quarterround transforms an arbitrary vector (ya, yb, yc, yd) of four
words into a vector (za, zb, zc, zd) by calculating
zb = yb ⊕ ((ya + yd)≪ 7)
zc = yc ⊕ ((zb + ya)≪ 9)
zd = yd ⊕ ((zc + zb)≪ 13)
za = ya ⊕ ((zd + zc)≪ 18) .
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This non-linear operation is the basic part of the columnround and the row-
round. The columnround converts the matrix column by column using the
quarterround by slightly shifting the entries of the columns as input for the
quarterround. The shifted columns as input vectors for the quarterround are
(y0, y4, y8, y12), (y5, y9, y13, y1), (y10, y14, y2, y6) and (y15, y3, y7, y11). Simi-
larly, the rowround transforms the matrix row by row using the quarterround
by slightly shifting the entries of the rows as input for the quarterround.
The shifted rows as input vectors for the quarterround are (y0, y1, y2, y3),
(y5, y6, y7, y4), (y10, y11, y8, y9) and (y15, y12, y13, y14). A so-called double-
round consists of a columnround followed by a rowround. The doubleround
function of Salsa20 is repeated 10 times. If Y denotes the matrix, a key-
stream block is defined by
Z = Y + doubleround10(Y ) .
The quarterround has 12 word operations. One columnround as well as
one rowround has 4 quarterrounds which means 48 word operations for each
one. Salsa20 consists of 10 doublerounds which altogether gives 960 word
operations. The feedforward at the end of Salsa20 has 16 word operations
which concludes 976 word operations in total for one encryption.
The cipher takes as input a 256-bit key (k0, . . . , k7), a 64-bit nonce
(n0, n1) and a 64-bit counter (c0, c1). The remaining four words have been
set by the designer to fixed publicly known constants
σ0 = 0x61707865 σ1 = 0x3320646e
σ2 = 0x79622d32 σ3 = 0x6b206574 ,
given in hexadecimal numbers. Then a starting state S is given by the matrix
S =

σ0 k0 k1 k2
k3 σ1 n0 n1
c0 c1 σ2 k4
k5 k6 k7 σ3
 .
A 128-bit key version of Salsa20 copies the 128-bit key twice and has slightly
different constants. In this chapter we mainly concentrate on the 256-bit key
version.
4.1.2 Slid Pairs
The structure of a doubleround can be rewritten as columnround, then a ma-
trix transposition, another columnround followed by a second transposition.
We define F to be a function which consists of a columnround followed by
a transposition. Now the 10 doublerounds can be transferred into 20 times
the function F . If we have two triples (k, n, c) and (k′, n′, c′) with keys k, k′,
nonces n, n′ and counters c, c′ so that
F
[
1st starting state (k, n, c)
]
= 2nd starting state (k′, n′, c′)
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then this property holds for each point during the round computation of
Salsa20, especially for the end of the round computation. Please note that
the feedforward at the end of Salsa20 destroys this property. We call such
a pair of a 1st and 2nd starting state a slid pair and show their relation in
Figure 4.1.
S Z
X
19×F
Z ′X
′
F19×FS′
F
Figure 4.1: Relation of a slid pair for Salsa20
In a starting state four words are constants and 12 words can be chosen
freely which leads to a total amount of 2384 possible starting states. If
we want a starting state – after applying function F – to result in a 2nd
starting state, we obtain four wordwise equations. This means we can choose
eight words of the 1st starting state freely whereas the other four words are
determined by the equations as well as the words for the 2nd starting state.
This leads to a total amount of 2256 possible slid pairs.
For the 128-bit key version no such slid pair exists due to the additional
constraints of four fewer words freedom in the 1st starting state and four
more wordwise equations in the 2nd starting state.
With function F we get two equations S′ = F(S) and X ′ = F(X). The
words for these matrices we denote as
S =

σ0 k0 k1 k2
k3 σ1 n0 n1
c0 c1 σ2 k4
k5 k6 k7 σ3
 S′ =

σ0 k
′
0 k
′
1 k
′
2
k′3 σ1 n′0 n′1
c′0 c′1 σ2 k′4
k′5 k′6 k′7 σ3

X =

x0 x1 x2 x3
x4 x5 x6 x7
x8 x9 x10 x11
x12 x13 x14 x15
 X ′ =

x′0 x′1 x′2 x′3
x′4 x′5 x′6 x′7
x′8 x′9 x′10 x′11
x′12 x′13 x′14 x′15

Z =

z0 z1 z2 z3
z4 z5 z6 z7
z8 z9 z10 z11
z12 z13 z14 z15
 Z ′ =

z′0 z′1 z′2 z′3
z′4 z′5 z′6 z′7
z′8 z′9 z′10 z′11
z′12 z′13 z′14 z′15
 .
The set up of the system of equations for a whole Salsa20 computation
is too complicated but the equations for the computation of F are very
clear. For a complete description of the equations see Appendix A. The
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structure of both systems of equations coming from the relation F is the
same, especially all the known variables are at the same place. Due to the
eight words freedom we have in a 1st or 2nd starting state, there are some
relations in the 12 non-fixed words. For the 2nd starting state these relations
are very clear as they only deal with words
0 = k′2 + k
′
1 0 = k
′
3 + n
′
1 0 = c
′
1 + c
′
0 and 0 = k
′
7 + k
′
6 . (4.1)
If we have an arbitrary starting state and the equations (4.1) are satisfied
we know this starting state is a 2nd starting state. In contrast, for the 1st
starting state the conditions to be a 1st starting state depend on the single
bits and not on words anymore. Thus, the conditions for a 1st starting state
are more complicated and not obvious, hence we omit them. Sliding by the
function F is applicable to any version of Salsa20/r where r is even. For
odd r there would be no transposition at the end of the round computation.
Consequentially the equations are a bit different, though still solvable.
4.1.3 Sliding State Recovery Attack on the Davies-Meyer
Mode
In this section we consider a general state-recovery slide attack on a Davies-
Meyer construction. We demonstrate it with an example of a Davies-Meyer
feedforward used with the iterative permutation of Salsa20. The feedfor-
ward breaks the sliding property and makes slide attack more complicated
to mount. We consider the following scenario:
1. The oracle chooses a secret 512-bit state S (here we assume that there
is no restriction of 128-bit diagonal constants and the full 512 bits can
be chosen at random).
2. The oracle computes F(S) = S′.
3. The oracle computes Z = Salsa20(S), Z ′ = Salsa20(S′) and gives them
to the attacker.
4. The goal of the attacker is to recover the secret state S.
Due to the weak diffusion of F we can write separate systems of equations
for each column of S. If we combine for one column the quarterround coming
from S′ = F(S), the corresponding quarterround from X ′ = F(X) and the
feedforward, we get a system with 16 equations shown below. We assume all
16 variables are unknown.
s′1 = s4 ⊕ ((s0 + s12)≪ 7)
s′2 = s8 ⊕ ((s′1 + s0)≪ 9)
s′3 = s12⊕ ((s′2 + s′1)≪ 13)
s′0 = s0 ⊕ ((s′3 + s′2)≪ 18)
x′1 = x4 ⊕ ((x0 + x12)≪ 7)
x′2 = x8 ⊕ ((x′1 + x0)≪ 9)
x′3 = x12⊕ ((x′2 + x′1)≪ 13)
x′0 = x0 ⊕ ((x′3 + x′2)≪ 18)
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z0 = x0 + s0
z4 = x4 + s4
z8 = x8 + s8
z12 = x12+ s12
z′0 = x′0 + s′0
z′1 = x′1 + s′1
z′2 = x′2 + s′2
z′3 = x′3 + s′3
This system can be reduced to four equations.
z′1 =
[
(z4 − s4)⊕
(
[(z0 − s0) + (z12 − s12)]≪ 7
)]
+
[
s4 ⊕
(
(s0 + s12)≪ 7
)] (4.2)
z′2 =
[
(z8 − s8)⊕
(
[(z′1 − s′1) + (z0 − s0)]≪ 9
)]
+
[
s8 ⊕
(
(s′1 + s0)≪ 9
)] (4.3)
z′3 =
[
(z12 − s12)⊕
(
[(z′2 − s′2) + (z′1 − s′1)]≪ 13
)]
+
[
s12 ⊕
(
(s′2 + s
′
1)≪ 13
)] (4.4)
z′0 =
[
(z0 − s0)⊕
(
[(z′3 − s′3) + (z′2 − s′2)]≪ 18
)]
+
[
s0 ⊕
(
(s′3 + s
′
2)≪ 18
)] (4.5)
In (4.2) we guess two variables out of s4, s0, s12 and calculate the third one.
With these three variables we calculate s′1 and solve (4.3) to get s8. Now we
can compute s′2, s′3, s′0 and check our guess with (4.4) and (4.5). Therefore,
the system of equations for one column with completely unknown variables
can be solved by guessing only two variables. Similarly, we solve the sys-
tems of equations for the other three columns. With the four guesses of 264
steps each we can completely recover the 512-bit secret state S. This shows
that Salsa20 without the diagonal constants is easily distinguishable from a
random function, for which a similar task would require about 2511 steps.
Now we add the diagonal constants which reduces the flexibility of the
oracle in a choice of the initial states to 2256 but the attack works even better:
1. The oracle chooses a starting state S′ with key k′, nonce n′ and counter
c′ satisfying equations (4.1). The attacker does not know this state.
2. The oracle applies F−1(S′) to compute the related key k, nonce n and
counter c for the starting state S.
3. The oracle computes Z = Salsa20(S), Z ′ = Salsa20(S′) and gives them
to the attacker.
4. The goal of the attacker is to recover the secret state S.
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The knowledge of the diagonal makes the previous attack even faster
and allows the full 384-bit (256-bit entropy) state recovery with complexity
of 4·232 because in the system of equations for each column only one variable
has to be guessed. If the attacker chooses the nonce and the counter n′, c′
(160-bit entropy) then the complexity drops to 2 ·232. Furthermore, if nonce
and counter n, c are known (128-bit entropy left), the state can be recovered
immediately (with or without knowing nonce and counter n′, c′) as shown in
the following section. Table 4.2 shows the time complexities for the described
attacks, memory complexity is negligible.
known words of the starting state sliding on Salsa20 random oracle
nothing 266 2511
only diagonal 234 2255
diagonal, n′, c′ 233 2159
diagonal, n, c directly 2127
diagonal, n, c and n′, c′ directly 263
Table 4.2: Time complexities for state-recovery attacks
4.1.4 Related Key Key-Recovery Attack on Salsa20
Let us assume that we know the two ciphertexts and the corresponding
nonces and counters of a slid pair. We do not know both keys but we know
that both starting states differ by function F which gives the relation shown
in Figure 4.2 and the fact that the 2nd starting state conforms to the initial
state format of Salsa20 (i.e. has proper 128-bit constant on the diagonal). In
this section we show that this information is sufficient to completely recover
the two related 256-bit secret keys of Salsa20 immediately.
→→ trans-
position
column
round
σ3 σ3σ3 k
′
4k7 k
′
7n
′
1 k
′
6k6k5 k
′
2 k
′
5
k′7 k′4k4 σ2σ2 σ2c′1c1 n′0c0 c′0k′1
n1 n
′
1k
′
6c
′
1n0 n
′
0σ1 σ1 σ1k
′
0 k
′
3k3
k′5k2 k′2k1 k′1c′0k′3k0 k′0σ0 σ0 σ0
Figure 4.2: Relation of the 1st and 2nd starting state (The grey squares are
the known words.)
With the knowledge of both nonces and counters we are able to recover
four words of the first unknown key and two words of the second unknown
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key (marked by bold letters in the following) by solving the equations1
k′3 = −n′1 k0 = k′3 ⊕ ((n′1 + n′0)≪ 13)
k6 = n′1 ⊕ ((n′0 + σ1)≪ 9) k′4 = −c′0 + ((c′1 ⊕ n0)≫ 13)
k1 = c′0 ⊕ ((k′4 + σ2)≪ 9) k7 = k′4 ⊕ ((σ2 + n0)≪ 7) .
At this point we still have not used the similar equations from the bottom
of the round computation. If parts of the nonce / counter are unknown these
equations can be used to check our guesses.
Then two similar systems of equations are left to get the other 10 key
words. For the first one we solve the equation
z′2 = [(z8− c0)⊕ ((z′1−k′0+z0−σ0)≪ 9)]+ [c0⊕ ((k′0+σ0)≪ 9)] , (4.6)
whereas some words of the ciphertexts are used and only k′0 is unknown.
With the solution of k′0 we get four more words
k′1 = c0 ⊕ ((k′0 + σ0)≪ 9) k′2 = −k′1
k5 = k′2 ⊕ ((k′1 + k′0)≪ 13) k3 = k′0 ⊕ ((σ0 + k5)≪ 7) .
For the second system we solve a similar equation to get k′5
z′13 = [(z7−n1)⊕((z′12−k′5+z15−σ3)≪ 9)]+[n1⊕((k′5+σ3)≪ 9)] . (4.7)
With the solution of k′5 we get the last four words
k′6 = n1 ⊕ ((k′5 + σ3)≪ 9) k′7 = −k′6
k4 = k′7 ⊕ ((k′6 + k′5)≪ 13) k2 = k′5 ⊕ ((σ3 + k4)≪ 7) .
Equation (4.6) (similarly (4.7)) can be solved by just checking all 232 possi-
bilities for k′0 (respectively k′5 for (4.7)), however it can be done much more
efficiently with less then 28 steps by guessing k′0 (or k′5) gradually and check-
ing the bitwise equations. We solved 16 equations but used 26 of the 64
equations in Appendix A to get these 16 equations. The complexity to get
all the 16 key words is approximately 56 word operations which is much
faster than a single Salsa20 encryption (976 word operations). We compute
Salsa20 for both keys and compare the calculated ciphertexts to the given
ones. If they match we have found the right keys.
4.1.5 A Generalized Related Key Attack on Salsa20
Suppose we are given a (possibly large) list of ciphertexts with the corre-
sponding nonces and counters and we are told that the slid pair is hidden in
this list. The question is: Can we efficiently find slid pairs in a large list of
1The complete system of equations is shown in Appendix A, here we only give the
rearranged equations.
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ciphertexts? As we saw in the previous section, it is easy to compute both
keys given such slid ciphertext pairs. The task is made more difficult by
the feedforward of Salsa20 which destroys the sliding relationship. Never-
theless, in this section we show that given a list of ciphertexts of size O(2l)
it is possible to detect a slid pair with memory and time complexity of just
O(2l).2 The naive approach, which would require to check the equations
from function F for each possible pair, will have complexity O(22l) which is
too expensive. Our idea is to reduce the amount of potential pairs by sorting
them by eight precomputed words, so that only elements where these eight
words match have the possibility to yield a slid pair. After decreasing the
number of possible pairs in that way we can check the remaining pairs using
additional constraints coming from the sliding equations.
For the sorting we use bucket sort because each word has only 232 possi-
bilities. The number of words we sort by is equal to the number of runs of
bucket sort.
We have a set M of ciphertexts with corresponding nonces and counters.
Each ciphertext can be either a 1st starting state or a 2nd starting state. To
regard this, the set is stored twice, first under M1 to check for possible 1st
starting states and second underM2 to check for possible 2nd starting states.
Step 1: Sort the first list
For each element in set M1, undo the feedforward for the four words on the
diagonal and for x9 = z9 − c1. Then sort M1 by the specified eight words
x0, x5, x10, x15, x9 and c1, z1, z13.
Step 2: Sort the second list3
Select only elements of M2 that satisfy equation 0 = c′0 + c′1 since only such
an entry can be a 2nd starting state. For each element undo the feedforward
for the four words on the diagonal and for x′6, . . . , x′9 because nonces and
counters are known. Then for each element compute the words marked in
bold in the equations
x0 = x′0 ⊕ ((z′2 + z′3)≪ 18) k′3 = −n′1
x5 = x′5 ⊕ ((z′4 + n′1 + x′7)≪ 18) x10 = x′10 ⊕ ((x′9 + x′8)≪ 18)
x15 =x′15⊕ ((z′13 + z′14)≪ 18) x1 = (z′4 + n′1)⊕ ((x′7 + x′6)≪ 13)
x9 = x′6 ⊕ ((x5 + x1)≪ 7) k0 = k′3 ⊕ ((n′1 + n′0)≪ 13)
c1 = n′0 ⊕ ((σ1 + k0)≪ 7) z1 = x1 + k0
k6 = n′1 ⊕ ((n′0 + σ1)≪ 9) z13 = (k6 + x′7)⊕ ((x′6 + x5)≪ 9) .
2Sorting is done via bucket sort so we save the logarithmic factor l in complexity.
3If the number of rounds of Salsa is odd then such simple sorting would not be possible
since Salsa equations are easier to solve in reverse direction. In our approach we know
two words at the input and three words at the output of the columnround which is easier
to solve than the opposite (three words at the input vs. two at the output). Nevertheless,
the system is still solvable.
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During this computation we calculate three key words k0, k6 and k′3. Sort
the set M2 by the calculated eight words x0, x5, x10, x15, x9 and c1, z1, z13 for
the potential 1st starting states.
Step 3: Check each possible pair
Cross check all the possible pairs that match in these eight words and thus
satisfy the 256-bit filtering. For the conforming pairs we can continue the
check using the equations below. If a test condition is wrong this pair can not
be a slid pair. For each pair undo the feedforward for the word x6 = z6−n0
of the ciphertext of the 1st starting state. Then compute the bold variables
and check the conditions for the three equations
compute k′4 = −c′0 + ((n0 ⊕ c′1)≫ 13)
x′11= −x′8 + ((x6 ⊕ x′9)≫ 13)
check z′11 = x′11 + k′4
compute k1 = c′0 ⊕ ((k′4 + σ2)≪ 9)
x2 = x′8 ⊕ ((x′11 + x10)≪ 9)
check z2 = x2 + k1
compute k7 = k′4 ⊕ ((σ2 + n0)≪ 7)
x14= x′11 ⊕ ((x10 + x6)≪ 7)
check z14 = x14 + k7 .
During this computation we calculate the three key words k1, k7 and k′4.
For the remaining pairs we have two further systems of equations to
check. For the first one we solve (4.6) and if there is no solution for k′0 this
pair can not be a slid pair. Otherwise, we use k′0 to compute four additional
key words while we check two more conditions
compute k′1 = c0 ⊕ ((k′0 + σ0)≪ 9)
k′2 = −k′1
k5 = k′2 ⊕ ((k′1 + k′0)≪ 13)
x′1 = z
′
1 − k′0
x12= (z′3 − k′2)⊕ ((z′2 − k′1 + x′1)≪ 13)
check z12 = x12 + k5
compute k3 = k′0 ⊕ ((σ0 + k5)≪ 7)
x4 = x′1 ⊕ ((x0 + x12)≪ 7)
check z4 = x4 + k3 .
For the second system we similarly solve (4.7) and again if there is no
solution for k′5 this pair can not be a slid pair. Otherwise, we use k′5 to
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compute the rest of the key words while we check two more conditions
compute k′6 = n1 ⊕ ((k′5 + σ3)≪ 9)
k′7 = −k′6
k4 = k′7 ⊕ ((k′6 + k′5)≪ 13)
x′12= z
′
12 − k′5
x11= (z′14 − k′7)⊕ ((z′13 − k′6 + x′12)≪ 13)
check z11 = x11 + k4
compute k2 = k′5 ⊕ ((σ3 + k4)≪ 7)
x3 = x′12 ⊕ ((x15 + x11)≪ 7)
check z3 = x3 + k2 .
We have nine extra test conditions to check the potential slid pairs. We
would only expect seven conditions but due to the different arithmetic op-
erations the dependencies of the equations are not clear. In total, we have
at least filtering power of 32 · 7 bits. Thus, we expect that only the correct
slid pairs survive this check. The remaining pairs are the correct slid pairs
for which we completely know both keys.
Complexity.
Assuming we are given a list of 2l ciphertexts with corresponding nonces and
counters. Instead of storing the list twice we use two kinds of pointers, one
kind for the potential 1st starting states and the other one for the potential
2nd starting states. For the pointers we need l32 · 2l words of memory. A
summary for the complexity of different lists is given in Table 4.3. The larger
the list of the random states in which our target is hidden – the larger would
be the complexity of the attack. However, the time complexity of the attack
grows only linearly with the size of the list.
list size memory in words time in Salsa20 clocks
2128 28 · 2128 2122
2192 32 · 2192 2186
2256 36 · 2256 2250
Table 4.3: Complexities for different list sizes
The number of slid pairs is 2256 which gives the probability of 2−128 for
a random starting state to be a 1st or a 2nd starting state. Via the birthday
paradox we expect the amount of 2256 random ciphertexts to contain both
stating states for one slid pair. We have described how to search in a big list
efficiently for a slid pair and recover both secret keys.
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4.1.6 Time-Memory Tradeoff Attacks on Salsa
Salsa20 has 2384 possible starting states. We notice that the square root of
2384 is less than the keyspace size for keys longer than 192 bits. Thus, a
trivial birthday attack on 256-bit key Salsa20 would proceed as follows:
During the preprocessing stage, we generate a list of 2192 randomly cho-
sen starting states and run Salsa20 for each of them to get a sample of
ciphertexts. Afterwards, we sort this list by the ciphertexts. During the
online stage, we capture 2192 ciphertexts for which we want to find the keys.
We do not have to store these ciphertexts and can check each of them imme-
diately for a match with the sorted array of precomputed ciphertexts. If we
have a match we retrieve the corresponding key from our table. Of course,
due to very high memory complexity this attack can only be viewed as a
certificational weakness.
If we can choose the nonce or the counter there are only 2320 different
starting states reducing the attack to precomputation and memory complex-
ity of 2160 and – if we can choose both – the state space drops to 2256 and the
attack complexity drops to 2128. Similar reasoning for 128-bit key Salsa20
would yield an attack with 264 complexity. Thus, it is crucial for the secu-
rity of Salsa20 that nonces are chosen at random for each new key and the
counter is not stuck at some fixed value (like 0, for example).
The complexities are summarized in Table 4.4 where R stands for a com-
plete run of Salsa20 and M for a matrix of Salsa (16 words).
precom- capturedattack
putation
memory time
ciphertext
chosen nonce and counter R · 2128 2M · 2128 2128 2128
chosen nonce or counter R · 2160 2M · 2160 2160 2160
general R · 2192 2M · 2192 2192 2192
using sliding property R · 2192 2.5M · 2192 2192 2191
Table 4.4: Complexities for the Birthday attack
Improved Birthday Using the Sliding Property.
We can use the sliding property to increase the efficiency of the birthday
attack twice (which can be translated into the reduction of memory or time,
or the increase of success probability of the birthday attack).
Salsa20 has 2384 possible starting states in total and the sliding property
reduces the number of possible starting states to 2257 (a slid pair has two
starting states). Hence, a random starting state has the probability of 2−127
to be a starting state for a slid pair (either 1st or 2nd one).
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During the preprocessing stage we generate a sample of 2192 2nd starting
states by using (4.1) of page 34 and choose the remaining eight words at
random. We compute the corresponding ciphertexts for these states as well
as the eight specified words for the corresponding 1st starting states as men-
tioned in step 2 of Section 4.1.5. We use two kinds of pointers to sort this
generated list by the ciphertexts for the 2nd starting states and by the eight
words for the corresponding 1st starting state. We capture ciphertext from
the keystream where we also know the nonce and the counter. The amount
of 2191 captured ciphertexts contains about either 264 1st starting states or
264 2nd starting states. We check if the ciphertext is a correct one for a 2nd
starting state from our list (direct birthday) or matches the eight words for
a 1st starting state for one of the states from our collection (then proceed
with step 3 as described in Section 4.1.5 to check the remaining eight words)
(indirect birthday). In both cases we obtain the key for this ciphertext.
4.2 Slid Pairs in Trivium
4.2.1 Brief Description of Trivium
The designers introduced the stream cipher Trivium with a state size of
288 bits. This internal state can be split into three registers as shown in
Figure 4.3. The first register which we call A has a length of 93, the second
one called B has a length of 84 and the last register named C has 111 bits.
The internal state is denoted in the following way:
A: (s1, s2, . . . , s93) B: (s94, s95, . . . , s177) C: (s178, s279, . . . , s288) .
t1
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Figure 4.3: Trivium with three registers
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Update and Keystream Production.
The non-linear update function of second degree uses 15 bits of the internal
state to compute three new bits, each for one register, and the keystream
bit zi is calculated by summing up only 6 of these 15 bits. In the following
pseudo-code all computations are over GF(2).
t1 ←− s66 + s93
t2 ←− s162 + s177
t3 ←− s243 + s288
zi ←− t1 + t2 + t3
t1 ←− t1 + s91 · s92 + s171
t2 ←− t2 + s175 · s176 + s264
t3 ←− t3 + s286 · s287 + s69
A: (s1, s2, ..., s93) ←− (t3, s1, . . . , s92)
B: (s94, s95, . . . , s177) ←− (t1, s94, . . . , s176)
C: (s178, s279, . . . , s288) ←− (t2, s178, . . . , s287)
Key and IV setup.
In register A the key of 80 bits is loaded and the last 13 bits are set to zero.
The IV is loaded into the first 80 bits of register B and the last 4 bits are set
to zero. In register C all positions are set to zero except for the last three
bits which are set to one.
A: (s1, s2, ..., s93) ←− (K80, . . . ,K1, 0, . . . , 0)
B: (s94, s95, . . . , s177) ←− (IV80, . . . , IV1, 0, . . . , 0)
C: (s178, s279, . . . , s288) ←− (0, . . . , 0, 1, 1, 1)
In this chapter we refer to this state with key, IV and 128 fixed positions
as starting state. After the registers are initialized in the described way, the
cipher is clocked 4 · 288 times using the update function without producing
any keystream bits. This will finish the key setup. Now each following clock
will produce a keystream bit.
4.2.2 Slid Pairs
We start with the observation made by Jin Hong on the eSTREAM fo-
rum [Hon05] that it is possible to produce sliding states in Trivium. We
searched for pairs of key and IV which produce another starting state after
a few clocks. If we have a key and IV pair (K1, IV1) which produces an-
other starting state with a key and IV (K2, IV2), the keystream created by
(K2, IV2) will be the same as the one created by (K1, IV1) except for a shift
of some bits. The number of shifted bits is equal to the number of clocks
needed to get from the 1st to the 2nd starting state. We call such a pair of
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two key and IV pairs a slid pair and denote this with [(K1, IV1), (K2, IV2), c]
whereas c stands for the number of clock-shifts.
Due to the special structure of the third register with 108 zeros and the
last three ones, the first possibility of a 2nd starting state to occur is after
111 clocks. Each following clock gives the chance for a 2nd starting state.
Table 4.5 shows two examples for slid pairs with different shifts written in
hexadecimal numbers. The bits for keys and IVs are ordered from 1 to 80
but in the key-IV setup they are used the other way around.
[(K1, IV1), (K2, IV2), 111]
K1 : 70011000001E00000000
IV1 : AF9D635BCEF9AE376CF7
keystream4: 2E7338CB404272ABEE3F7BEC2F8D
55E27536D29AFFFF15DFDFD711AECC78D13D7B61 . . .
K2 : 780000001DA2000003C1
IV2 : 1DF35CF6D4FFF4E3A6C0
keystream: 55E27536D29AFFFF15DFDFD711AECC78D13D7B61 . . .
[(K3, IV3), (K4, IV4), 112]
K3 : 02065B9C001730000000
IV3: 609FC141828705160A3C
keystream: A48BCA9143685F03DE646F83AB52
88BC9542798983349A959503E63BBF29C4755DE6 . . .
K4 : B98000003E96E70005CE
IV4 : 2B7C1483BC476A62E4CB
keystream: 88BC9542798983349A959503E63BBF29C4755DE6 . . .
Table 4.5: Two examples for slid pairs with different shifts
4.2.3 Systems of Equations
We describe the 2nd starting state as polynomial equations in the 80 key and
80 IV variables of the 1st pair. The 128 fixed positions in a starting state
yield a system of equations with 160 variables and 128 equations. We have
more variables than equations which results in 232 solutions. To solve these
systems we tried the F4 algorithm implemented in the computer algebra
system Magma to get a Gröbner basis and the solutions for (K1, IV1) but
gave up after c = 115 because of the long computation time. A more brute
force approach – guessing a part of the variables, checking this guess and
outputting the solution – which we implemented for each individual c worked
4The shift is c = 111 which means the first 111 bits are a prefix. When rewriting this
prefix from hexadecimal to binary numbers the leading zero must be omitted because 111
is not a multiple of 4.
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much better. To get the 2nd key and IV we can use the systems of equations
which describe the key and IV in the 2nd starting state just inserting the
known values of the 1st key and IV pair or simply clock Trivium c times
starting from (K1, IV1) to get (K2, IV2).
Some Facts about these Systems.
The system of equations for the first instance which appears after 111 clocks
contains only 136 variables because the last 24 bits of the key do not occur
in this system. Furthermore, 16 bits are given a priori due to the 13 zeros
in register A and 3 ones in register C. The degree of the monomials in the
equations is raised from 1 to 3. Due to the 24 key bits missing in the
equations, these bits can be chosen arbitrarily. This leads us to 224 different
keys for one IV in the 1st key and IV pair of a slid pair. Table 4.6 collects
some facts for the systems which we solved with our brute force approach.
clock-shift c 111 112 113 114 115 116 · · · 124
variables in equations 136 137 138 139 140 141 · · · 149
last key bits
not in the equation
24 23 22 21 20 19 · · · 11
a priori given bits 16 15 14 13 13 13 · · · 13
computing time
for Magma in days
2.5 2.5 10 32.5 64 – – –
guess bits for Magma5 0 4 6 8 10 – – –
Table 4.6: Some facts for the systems of equations
We found that we sometimes have slightly less but mostly have slightly
more solutions that we would have expected as shown in Table 4.7.
The higher the clock-shift will be, the more complicated the systems of
equations will become. For each clock-shift another system of equations is
needed but for every step of c most of the equations are the same or related.
Due to the length of register C which defines the occurrence of a second
starting state we have at least 111 clock-shifts. Thus, we expect a minimum
111 · 232 ≈ 239 slid pairs just within a shift of 221 bits of each other. There
are much more slid pairs for longer shifts but the equations would be much
more complicated.
Non-existence of Special Slid Pairs.
We searched for slid pairs with additional constraints. The first type applies
when the keys in both key and IV pairs are the same for any clock-shift c:
([(K, IV1), (K, IV2)], c), and the second type applies when both times the
5We guessed these bits to get a solution from Magma in a reasonable amount of time.
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c expected real solutions
111 28 28 + 84
112 29 29 – 72
113 210 210 – 176
114 211 211 + 29
115 212 212 – 28
116 213 213 – 27
117 214 214 – 29
118 215 215 + 212 + 210 + 29
119 216 216 + 213
120 217 217 – 212
121 218 218 + 214 + 212 + 211
122 219 219 + 214 + 213 + 212 + 210
123 220 220 + 215
124 221 221 + 213 + 210 + 29
Table 4.7: Some facts for solutions of different systems of equations
same IV is used for any clock-shift c: ([(K1, IV ), (K2, IV )], c). In both cases
the fixed 2nd key or IV leads to 80 additional equations which account for
the occurrence of all 80-bit of key or IV resulting in overdefined systems with
208 equations and 160 variables. For both types the systems are not likely
to be solvable for any reasonably small amount of shift. As a result of the
48 extra equations the chance for such a system to have a solution is about
2−48. We computed that for the first 31 instances (clock-shifts 111 up to
142) these systems have no solution.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter we have described sliding properties of Salsa20 and Trivium
which lead to distinguishing, key-recovery and related key attacks on these
ciphers. We have also shown that Salsa20 does not offer 256-bit security
due to a simple birthday attack on its 384-bit state. Since the likelihood
of falling in our related key classes by chance is relatively low (2256 out of
2384 for Salsa20, 239 out of 280 for Trivium), these attacks do not threaten
most of the real-life usage of these ciphers. However, designers of protocols
which would use these primitives should definitely be aware of these non-
randomness properties which can be exploited in certain scenarios.
In 2011 Bernstein [Ber11] published a modified version of Salsa20 called
XSalsa20 which uses a 192-bit nonce. XSalsa20 uses the Salsa20 matrix
and the Salsa20 computations but performs one step prior to the keystream
generation. For this step the matrix is loaded with the constants, the key and
the first 128 bits of the 192-bit nonce which are placed at the positions of the
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former 64-bit nonce and 64-bit counter. Thereafter, Salsa20 is performed on
this matrix without the feedforward at the end. Eight words are taken from
the output matrix, four words at the diagonal and four words at the positions
of the former 64-bit nonce and 64-bit counter. This concludes the prior step
and these eight words are used as key for the keystream generation. Now
XSalsa20 behaves like Salsa20 and the matrix is loaded with the constants,
the eight specified words as key, the last 64 bits of the 192-bit nonce as 64-bit
nonce and the 64-bit counter. The sliding property of Salsa20 is preserved
for the keystream generation of XSalsa20 but not for the prior step. Thus,
we can compute the starting matrix for the keystream generation but not
the key itself.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of SNOW3G⊕ and
SNOW2.0⊕ Resynchronization
Mechanism
The stream cipher SNOW3G is the core of the 3GPP confidentiality and
integrity algorithms UEA2 and UIA2, published in 2006 by the 3GPP Task
Force [ETS06a]. Compared to its predecessor SNOW2.0 [EJ02], SNOW3G
adopts a Finite State Machine (FSM) of three 32-bit words and two S-
boxes to increase the resistance against the algebraic attacks by Billet and
Gilbert [BG05]. Full evaluation of the design by the consortium is not
public but a survey of this evaluation is given in [ETS06b]. Furthermore,
SNOW3G⊕ (in which the two modular additions are replaced by XORs) is
defined and evaluated in [ETS06b]. The designers and external reviewers
show that SNOW3G has remarkable resistance against linear distinguishing
attacks [NW06, WBdC03], while SNOW3G⊕ offers much better resistance
against algebraic attacks than SNOW2.0⊕. A fault analysis of SNOW3G is
presented by Debraize [DC09] in 2009 using only 22 fault injections to reveal
the secret key. In 2010 Brumley et al. [BHNS10] show a cache-timing attack
on SNOW3G retrieving the complete internal state from empirical timing
data in a matter of seconds, without known keystream and only observation
of a small number of cipher clocks.
The stream cipher SNOW2.0 was published in 2002 by Ekdahl and
Johansson [EJ02]. Previous attacks on SNOW2.0 used linear distinguish-
ers to distinguish the keystream of SNOW2.0 from a truly random se-
quence. A distinguishing attack with linear masking was applied by Watan-
abe et al. [WBdC03] in 2003. It requires 2225 words of output and has a
complexity of 2225. This attack was later improved by Nyberg and Wal-
lén [NW06] in 2006 to a linear distinguisher which needs 2179 bits of key-
stream and 2174 operations. A completely different kind of attack was pro-
posed by Billet and Gilbert [BG05] in 2005. They showed that a slightly
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simplified version of SNOW2.0 can be broken using a linearization attack
with a complexity of 250 and only 1,000 words of keystream to get the initial
state of the Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). The extension of this at-
tack to the actual SNOW2.0 leads to a overdetermined system of quadratic
equations for which the solving complexity remains unknown so far.
In this chapter we present the first attempt of cryptanalysis of SNOW3G⊕
in public literature. We show that the feedback from the FSM to the LFSR
during the initialization phase is vital for the security of this cipher, since
we can break a version without such a feedback with two known IV’s in
256.1 time, 233 data and 225 memory complexity, and for any amount of
initialization rounds! We then restore the feedback and study SNOW3G⊕
against differential chosen IV attacks. We show attacks on SNOW3G⊕ with
14, 15 and 16 rounds of initialization with time complexities 242.1, 291.3 and
2123.3 respectively. Afterwards, we perform the same kind of attacks on
SNOW2.0⊕. The known IV attack on a version without the feedback from
the FSM to the LFSR during the initialization phase requires 236.5 time, 62
data and 230 memory complexities, and works for any amount of initializa-
tion rounds, too. For SNOW2.0⊕ with the feedback we found differential
chosen IV attacks on 14 up to 18 rounds of initialization with 236.4 time and
small memory complexities up to 2122 time and 2123 memory complexities.
This chapter is organized as follows: We give a description of SNOW3G
and SNOW2.0 as well as their simplified versions SNOW3G⊕ and SNOW2.0⊕
in Section 5.1. The known and chosen IV attacks on SNOW3G⊕ are pre-
sented in Section 5.2 and the similar attacks on SNOW2.0⊕ are shown in
Section 5.3. Finally, some conclusions are given in Section 5.4.
5.1 Description of both SNOW Ciphers
5.1.1 Description of SNOW3G and SNOW3G⊕
SNOW3G is a word-oriented synchronous stream cipher with a 128-bit key
and a 128-bit initial value (IV), each considered as four 32-bit words. It con-
sists of a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) of sixteen 32-bit words and
a Finite State Machine (FSM) with three 32-bit words, shown in Figure 5.1.
The symbol ’⊕’ denotes the bitwise XOR and ’¢’ denotes the addition
modulo 232. The feedback word of the LFSR is recursively computed as
st+115 = α
−1 · st11 ⊕ st2 ⊕ α · st0 ,
where α is the root of the irreducible GF (28)[x] polynomial
x4 + β23x3 + β245x2 + β48x+ β239
with β being the root of the irreducible GF (2)[x] polynomial
x8 + x7 + x5 + x3 + 1 .
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Figure 5.1: Keystream generation of SNOW3G
The FSM has two input words st15 and st5 from the LFSR and computes at
first the output word F as
F t = (st15 ¢Rt1)⊕Rt2 .
Afterwards, the FSM is updated as
Rt+11 = R
t
2 ¢ (Rt3 ⊕ st5) Rt+12 = S1(Rt1) Rt+13 = S2(Rt2) ,
where S1 and S2 are 32-bit to 32-bit S-boxes defined as compositions of four
parallel applications of two 8-bit to 8-bit small S-boxes SR and SQ, with a
linear diffusion layer respectively. Here SR is the well-known AES S-box and
SQ is defined as
SQ(y) = y ⊕ y9 ⊕ y13 ⊕ y15 ⊕ y33 ⊕ y41 ⊕ y45 ⊕ y47 ⊕ y49 ⊕ 0x25
for y ∈ GF (28) defined by x8 + x6 + x5 + x3 + 1. If we decompose a 32-bit
word w into four bytes w = w(0)‖w(1)‖w(2)‖w(3) with w(0) being the most
and w(3) the least significant bytes, then the S-boxes are
S1(w) = MC1 ·
[
SR(w(0)), SR(w(1)), SR(w(2)), SR(w(3))
]T
S2(w) = MC2 ·
[
SQ(w(0)), SQ(w(1)), SQ(w(2)), SQ(w(3))
]T
,
where MC1 is the AES MixColumns operation for S1 over GF (28) defined
by x8+x4+x3+x+1 and MC2 is the similar operation for S2 over GF (28)
defined by x8 + x6 + x5 + x3 + 1.
SNOW3G is initialized with the four word key K = (k0, k1, k2, k3) and
the four word IV = (IV0, IV1, IV2, IV3). Let 1 be the all-one word, then the
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LFSR is loaded as follows:
s15 = k3 ⊕ IV0 s14 = k2 s13 = k1 s12 = k0 ⊕ IV1
s11 = k3 ⊕ 1 s10 = k2 ⊕ 1⊕ IV2 s9 = k1 ⊕ 1⊕ IV3 s8 = k0 ⊕ 1
s7 = k3 s6 = k2 s5 = k1 s4 = k0
s3 = k3 ⊕ 1 s2 = k2 ⊕ 1 s1 = k1 ⊕ 1 s0 = k0 ⊕ 1
The FSM is initialized with R1 = R2 = R3 = 0. Then the cipher runs 32
clocks in the initialization mode doing:
1. compute the output F t of the FSM,
2. update the FSM,
3. clock the LFSR with F t XORed to the feedback of the LFSR.
After this, the cipher is switched to the keystream generation mode. As long
as keystream is needed the cipher does:
1. compute the output F t of the FSM,
2. update the FSM,
3. compute the keystream word zt = st0 ⊕ F t,
4. clock the LFSR.
Please note that the first keystream word is discarded. Hence, there are 33
initialization rounds.
If we replace the two modulo additions in SNOW3G by XORs we get
SNOW3G⊕. In each clock SNOW3G⊕ executes two S-boxes, two multipli-
cations and seven XORs. We will measure the time complexity of our attacks
in SNOW3G⊕ clocks.
5.1.2 Description of SNOW2.0 and SNOW2.0⊕
The only difference between SNOW3G and SNOW2.0 is the absence of the
second S-box S2 and the third word R3 of the FSM as shown in Figure 5.2.
All other equations, the initialization mode and the keystream generation
are the same for SNOW2.0. Two key sizes are allowed for SNOW2.0 a
128-bit key and a 256-bit key but for the larger key the mixing and loading
step is slightly different. A more detailed description is given in [EJ02]. In
our attacks we concentrate on the 128-bit key version. If we replace the
two modulo additions in SNOW2.0 by XORs we get SNOW2.0⊕. In each
clock SNOW2.0⊕ executes one S-box, two multiplications and six XORs.
Analog to SNOW3G⊕ we will measure the time complexity of our attacks
on SNOW2.0⊕ in clocks of SNOW2.0⊕.
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Figure 5.2: Figure of the keystream generation of SNOW2.0
5.2 Known and Chosen IV Attacks on Versions of
SNOW3G⊕
In this section we will present a known IV attack on SNOW3G⊕ without
the FSM to LFSR feedback during the initialization phase. Afterwards, we
restore the feedback and show a differential chosen IV attack on SNOW3G⊕
with a reduced number of initialization rounds.
In both attacks the attacker has access to two keystreams corresponding
to (K, IVa) and (K, IVb), where IVa and IVb are either arbitrary known IVs
or IVs chosen by the attacker. The goal is to recover the internal state and
thus the secret key from the known or chosen differences. All attacks have
a similar structure, they begin with a starting step, which is different for
each attack, followed by a reduction step and then finish with an insertion
step.
In the starting step we only use the differences in the LFSR and the
keystream to deduce potential differences in the FSM words exploiting the
non-linearity from the S-boxes. In the reduction step we switch from the
differences in the FSM words to the individual values of the FSM words
to reduce the amount of potential differences exploiting the non-linearity of
the S-boxes again. In the insertion step we simply insert the collected
individual values for the FSM words in one system of keystream equations.
5.2.1 Difference Propagation through the S-boxes
To recover the initial state from the differences we need to know how the dif-
ferences propagate through the S-boxes. Let va, vb, wa, wb, xa, xb be arbitrary
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words satisfying the following equations for the first S-box
∆v = va ⊕ vb wa = S1(va) wb = S1(vb)
∆w = wa ⊕ wb = S1(va)⊕ S1(vb) .
We define a new notation for the last row
out
∆ S1(∆v)
def.= S1(va)⊕ S1(vb) .
Similarly, we have for the second S-box
∆w = wa ⊕ wb xa = S2(wa) xb = S2(wb)
∆x = xa ⊕ xb = S2(wa)⊕ S2(wb) .
Likewise, we define a new notation for the last row
out
∆ S2(∆w)
def.= S2(wa)⊕ S2(wb) .
In the same way we define the output difference for the small S-box SR as
out
∆ SR(∆y) for a byte ∆y and
out
∆ SQ(∆y) for the small S-box SQ. For a fixed
input difference ∆y we get at most 127 possible output differences for the
small S-box SR. This yields approximately 228 possible output differences
for the S-box S1 for a fixed input difference ∆v. Also, we get at most 127
possible output differences for the small S-box SQ resulting in about 228
possible output differences for the S-box S2. It is obvious that for a zero
input difference, the output difference will be zero as well for all S-boxes. If
we can fix the input difference ∆v to a word with three bytes equal to zero
and only one non-zero byte, we would get 27 possibilities for
out
∆ S1(∆v) as
well as 27 possibilities for
out
∆ S2(∆v).
The knowledge of an input-output difference ∆v → S1 → ∆w with fixed
differences ∆v and ∆w for the first S-box allows us to recover on average
(2 · 126127 + 4 · 1127)4 ≈ 16.51 pairs of individual values for (va, vb). If we know
the pair (va, vb) we know (wa, wb), too. The number of 2 · 126127 +4 · 1127 ≈ 2.02
pairs comes from the difference propagation of the small S-box SR. We have
computed that the 256 pairs of individual values for each input difference
unequal to zero yield exactly 127 output differences. In 126 cases the output
difference is the same for two pairs and once four pairs result in the same
output difference. Thus, in the 16.51 possible pairs of individual values we
have around 8.255 times the case of two pairs (va, vb) and (vb, va).
Now we can apply the second S-box to the individual values wa and wb
and yield values xa = S2(wa) and xb = S2(wb). The 16.51 possible pairs
for the individual values result in 8.255 possibilities for ∆x due to the fact
that each two pairs (va, vb) and (vb, va) give two pairs (xa, xb) and (xb, xa)
yielding the same difference ∆x. If we can fix this difference as well, yielding
a known input-output difference sequence ∆v → S1 → ∆w → S2 → ∆x,
only two pairs of individual values will conform to this difference sequence,
namely (va, vb) and (vb, va).
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5.2.2 Known IV Attack without FSM to LFSR Feedback
In this section we consider a known IV attack on SNOW3G⊕ without the
FSM to LFSR feedback, in which the attacker has access to two keystreams
corresponding to (K, IVa) and (K, IVb), where IVa and IVb are arbitrary
known IVs. This attack works for any number of initialization rounds.
During the keystream generation, we have the following equations for the
differences at clock t:
∆zt = ∆st15 ⊕∆Rt1 ⊕∆Rt2 ⊕∆st0 ∆Rt2 =
out
∆ S1(∆Rt−11 )
∆Rt1 = ∆R
t−1
2 ⊕∆Rt−13 ⊕∆st−15 ∆Rt3 =
out
∆ S2(∆Rt−12 ) .
The differences in the LFSR depend on the known difference of the IVs and
are completely predictable due to the linearity.
The main procedures of our attack are: Assume that ∆Rt1 = 0 is given
at time t. Deduce potential differences in the FSM words at different times
from the linear evolution of the difference in the LFSR and the keystream
difference equations. Knowing the input-output difference for the S-boxes,
the few possibilities for the individual values of the FSM words are deduced.
Combine the knowledge of the FSM state with that of the keystream to
get linear equations on the LFSR state. Collect enough equations to get
a solvable linear system which will recover the state of the LFSR. By the
invertibility of the cipher run it backwards to find the 128-bit secret key K.
Assume ∆Rt1 = 0. If this is not true, just take the next clock and so on.
If we try this step 232 times, then it will happen with a good probability.
Denote the time when ∆Rt1 = 0 by t = 1, then ∆R11 = 0 implicates ∆R22 = 0
and ∆R33 = 0 due to the difference propagation of the S-boxes. From the
keystream equation at t = 1 we know ∆R12. Similarly, we know ∆R21 from
which we can derive ∆R13 via the update equation. Hereafter, we denote the
known difference values by ∆ki and yield the state of the FSM as follows:
clock t ∆Rt1 ∆Rt2 ∆Rt3
1 0 ∆k0 ∆k2
2 ∆k1 0
3 0
Starting step: For clock 3 we take the keystream equation and the
update equation of ∆R31, which are
∆z3 = ∆s315 ⊕∆R31 ⊕∆R32 ⊕∆s30 ,
∆R31 = ∆R
2
2 ⊕∆R23 ⊕∆s25 ,
and combine them to one equation
∆R23 ⊕∆R32 = ∆z3 ⊕∆s315 ⊕∆s25 ⊕∆s30 .
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We know the right part completely and denote it with∆k3. By the notations
introduced in Section 5.2.1 we get
out
∆ S2(∆k1)⊕
out
∆ S1(∆k2) = ∆k3 . (5.1)
We have 2
28·228
232
= 224 pairs satisfying this equation. To enumerate the
possible pairs we first rewrite (5.1) as
out
∆ SR(∆k
(0)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(1)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(2)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(3)
2 )
 =

out
∆ SQ(∆k
(0)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(1)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(2)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(3)
1 )
 ⊕

pmsb0
pmsb1
pmsb2
pmsb3
 ⊕ MC−11 ·

∆k(0)3
∆k(1)3
∆k(2)3
∆k(3)3
,
where pmsbi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) denotes a byte polynomial which contains only
the most significant bits of all four values
out
∆ SQ. For a detailed explanation
please see Appendix B. Thus, we can fulfill the enumeration byte by byte.
For the first row we need the value of
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(0)
1 ), which has 2
7 possibilities,
and three more bits for pmsb0 . Then we check whether the value computed
at the right side of the equation is a correct value for
out
∆ SR(∆k
(0)
2 ). We
will obtain 29 solutions for this byte equation. For the next three equations
we already know the leading bits, which gives only 26 possibilities left in
each byte equation resulting in 25 solutions. To get the solution of the
word equation we have to combine the corresponding byte solutions and get
29 · 25 · 25 · 25 = 224 solutions, which needs about 2 · 224 = 225 words of
memory. The time complexity of this step is negligible as we only have a
few XORs on bytes – the multiplication with MC−11 has to be done only
once prior we try all the byte possibilities. Now the states of the FSM are
as follows:
clock t ∆Rt1 ∆Rt2 ∆Rt3
1 0 ∆k0 ∆k2
2 ∆k1 0 (224)
3 (224) (224) 0
4
Each possible value of ∆R32 results in a possible value of ∆R41. At clock 4
we have
∆R32 ⊕∆R42 = ∆z4 ⊕∆s415 ⊕∆s35 ⊕∆s40 .
Replacing the difference∆R42 with the notation of Section 5.2.1 and denoting
the known right part with ∆k4 we receive
∆R32⊕
out
∆ S1(∆R31) = ∆k4 .
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Let ∆R31 = v(0)‖v(1)‖v(2)‖v(3) and ∆R32 = w(0)‖w(1)‖w(2)‖w(3). Expanding
this equation to the byte form we get
out
∆ SR(v(0))
out
∆ SR(v(1))
out
∆ SR(v(2))
out
∆ SR(v(3))
 = MC−11 ·

w(0)
w(1)
w(2)
w(3)
 ⊕ MC−11 ·

∆k(0)4
∆k(1)4
∆k(2)4
∆k(3)4
 .
We have to insert all 224 possible pairs (∆R31,∆R32) and verify the values
out
∆ SR for the single bytes. This results in a time complexity of 224 · 12 = 223
clocks. There are 2
24·228
232
= 220 entries satisfying this equation. This means
that we have 220 sequences (∆R23,∆R31,∆R32,∆R41,∆R42) left which gives the
following state of the FSM:
clock t ∆Rt1 ∆Rt2 ∆Rt3
1 0 ∆k0 ∆k2
2 ∆k1 0 (220)
3 (220) (220) 0
4 (220) (220)
The naive approach would be to continue checking the differences with
the keystream equation at clock 5. The combined equation is
∆R42⊕
out
∆ S2(∆R32)⊕
out
∆ S1(∆R41) = ∆k5 .
We would have to insert all 220 possibilities for the sequences and check
two S-boxes. In total 2
20·228·228
232
= 244 sequences would satisfy this equation.
Thus, we would get more and more sequences with each clock.
Instead of increasing the number of difference sequences we reduce them
exploiting the non-linearity of the S-boxes. We do no longer consider only
the differences of the FSM values. We rather switch to the individual values
of the FSM words.
Reduction step: For each of the 220 sequences we know the input-
output difference of S1 at clock 2 and 3: ∆R21 → S1 → ∆R32. As explained
in Section 5.2.1 we can recover 16.51 pairs (R21,a, R21,b) on average. This
means that we have 8.255 possible values for ∆R43. Looking at clock 5 we
have
∆R42 ⊕∆R43⊕
out
∆ S1(∆R41) = ∆k5 .
Let ∆R41 = v(0)‖v(1)‖v(2)‖v(3), ∆R42 = w(0)‖w(1)‖w(2)‖w(3) and ∆R43 =
x(0)‖x(1)‖x(2)‖x(3). We can rewrite this equation into byte form
out
∆ SR(v(0))
out
∆ SR(v(1))
out
∆ SR(v(2))
out
∆ SR(v(3))
 = MC−11 ·

w(0)
w(1)
w(2)
w(3)
 ⊕ MC−11 ·

x(0)
x(1)
x(2)
x(3)
 ⊕ MC−11 ·

∆k(0)5
∆k(1)5
∆k(2)5
∆k(3)5
.
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We have to insert all 220 possible pairs (∆R41,∆R42) with the corresponding
8.255 possible values of ∆R43 and verify the values
out
∆ SR for the single bytes.
There are 2
20·8.255·228
232
≈ 219.05 possible sequences left and the time complexity
is 220 ·8.255 · 12 ≈ 222.05 clocks. This identification of the individual values in
the FSM for both keystreams has to be repeated for the next nine clocks to
get enough individual values to compute the complete internal state. Each
check will have a lower time complexity than the one before and will reduce
the possible number of differences. The time complexity for all ten checks
together in SNOW3G⊕ clocks is(
10∑
i=1
220 · 8.255i · (2−4)i−1
)
· 1
2
≈ 223.1 .
During this reduction step the memory requirements will not exceed 222
words. The number of sequences left is 220 · 8.25510 · (2−4)10 ≈ 210.5.
Insertion step: Now we insert the individual values of the FSM into
the keystream generation equations and the FSM update equations to get a
linear system of the LFSR initial state. For each difference ∆Ri1 we have two
pairs (Ri1,a, Ri1,b) and (R
i
1,b, R
i
1,a) for i = 2, . . . , 12. Thus, we have to insert
both values Ri1,a or Ri1,b but we only need the system of equations for one
keystream. This would need a time complexity of 210.5 · 210 ≈ 220.5 clocks.
We can check with the keystream equation of clock 1 whether we took the
right value of the pairs (Ri1,a, Ri1,b). Then we clock backwards to receive the
secret key K.
Results: The overall time complexity in SNOW3G⊕ clocks is
232 · (223 + 223.1 + 220.5) ≈ 256.1 .
The memory requirements are 225 words and the keystream is of length 233
words, especially 232 consecutive words for both keystreams.
5.2.3 Differential Chosen IV Attacks
Now we look at SNOW3G⊕ with the FSM to LFSR feedback during the
initialization but reduced number of initialization rounds. We show attacks
on 12 to 16 initialization rounds. All attacks are similar having the starting
step, which is slightly different for each number of initialization rounds,
followed by the reduction step and then finish with the insertion step.
We consider a differential chosen IV attack scenario. Assume that we have
two 128-bit IVs differing only in the most significant word IV0, which gives
the difference in s15 of the LFSR. As we will see below for the 13 and 14
rounds case we can restrict the difference to a single byte of IV0 in order to
reduce the complexity of our attacks. We denote this difference by ∆d. Until
round 11 this difference will not affect the FSM. After round 11 the known
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∆d enters the FSM word R1. In this section we denote the first displayed
keystream word with z0 and increase the clock for the following keystream
words. The previous initialization rounds will have negative clocks. As
described in Section 5.1.1 the first computed keystream word is discarded.
Hence, clock −1 will have no feedback from the FSM to the LFSR and no
keystream word.
Reduced Initialization of 12 Rounds.
Since all the differences in the FSM are zero, there are no differences fed
back into the LFSR. Thus, the differences in the LFSR are all known. Our
knowledge of the differences in the FSM is shown in the following table:
round clock t ∆Rt1 ∆Rt2 ∆Rt3
12 −1 ∆d 0 0
0 ∆d 0
1
The starting step is very easy because from the first keystream equation
with ∆R01 = ∆d we get ∆R02, which gives us immediately ∆R11 and also ∆R12
from the next keystream equation. Thus, we only have one known sequence
(∆R−11 = ∆d, ∆R
−1
2 = ∆R
−1
3 = 0, ∆R
0
1 = ∆d, ∆R
0
2, ∆R
0
3 = 0, ∆R
1
1, ∆R
1
2).
We perform the reduction step in order to get the individual values
for the words of the FSM. Starting with the known input-output difference
∆R−11 = ∆d→ S1 → ∆R02 we proceed as explained in the reduction step on
page 57. The time complexity is 10 · 8.255 · 12 ≈ 25.4 clocks. We have one
sequence left and for each ∆Ri1 only two pairs (Ri1,a, Ri1,b) and (R
i
1,b, R
i
1,a)
with i = −1, . . . , 8.
Afterwards, we execute the insertion step as explained on page 58 with
a time complexity of 210 clocks. We use the keystream equation of clock 12
to check the candidates.
Results: The total time complexity in SNOW3G⊕ clocks is
25.4 + 210 ≈ 210.1 ,
the memory requirements are small and the needed keystream is only 12
consecutive words for each IV.
Reduced Initialization of 13 Rounds.
Here we extend the attack above by one more round. In the 13 round case,
since until now all the differences in the FSM are either zero or the known
∆d, no unknown difference was fed back into the LFSR. Thus, the differences
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in the LFSR values are known. We know the differences in the FSM as shown
in the following table:
round clock t ∆Rt1 ∆Rt2 ∆Rt3
12 −2 ∆d 0 0
13 −1 ∆d 0
0
Starting step: From the first keystream equation and the update equa-
tions we receive
∆R−12 ⊕∆R02 = ∆z0 ⊕∆s015 ⊕∆s−15 ⊕∆s00 .
Then we replace the differences at the left side with the notation introduced
in Section 5.2.1, denote the known part at the right side with k0 and obtain
the equation
out
∆ S1(∆d)⊕
out
∆ S1(∆d) = ∆k0 .
Multiplying by MC−11 we get the byte form equation
out
∆ SR(∆d(0))
out
∆ SR(∆d(1))
out
∆ SR(∆d(2))
out
∆ SR(∆d(3))
 ⊕

out
∆ SR(∆d(0))
out
∆ SR(∆d(1))
out
∆ SR(∆d(2))
out
∆ SR(∆d(3))
 = MC−11 ·

∆k(0)0
∆k(1)0
∆k(2)0
∆k(3)0
 .
We can check these four byte equations in a negligible time complexity as
we only have a few XORs. The number of solutions will be 2
28·228
232
= 224
pairs of (∆R−12 ,∆R
0
2) which has memory requirements of 225 words. We
have 224 sequences (∆R−21 = ∆d, ∆R
−2
2 = ∆R
−2
3 = 0, ∆R
−1
1 = ∆d, ∆R
−1
2 ,
∆R−13 = 0, ∆R
0
1, ∆R
0
2).
Again, we go through the reduction step as explained on page 57 to
reduce the number of sequences and to get the individual values for the FSM.
We start with the input-output difference ∆R−21 = ∆d→ S1→ ∆R−12 . The
time complexity of this step is
(∑10
i=1 2
24 · 8.255i · (2−4)i−1
)
· 12 ≈ 227.1 clocks.
At the end we have 224 · 8.25510 · (2−4)10 ≈ 214.5 difference sequences left.
The memory requirements will not exceed 226 words.
Now we perform the insertion step as explained on page 58, which
would require a time complexity of 214.5 · 210 ≈ 224.5 clocks.
Results: The overall time complexity in SNOW3G⊕ clocks is
227.1 + 224.5 ≈ 227.3 .
The memory requirements are 226 words and the keystream is of length 12
consecutive words for each IV.
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Restriction: If we restrict the known arbitrary difference ∆d to a word
with three bytes equal to zero and only one non-zero byte, we can reduce
our attack complexity considerably. After the starting step we only have
one pair (∆R−12 ,∆R
0
2) of differences left, just as in the attack on 12 rounds
explained on page 59. This way we will have the same time complexity of
210.1 clocks and the memory requirements are small. The keystream will be
of 12 consecutive words for each IV.
Reduced Initialization of 14 Rounds.
After 14 initialization rounds, we have one unknown difference in the LFSR
since the difference ∆R−22 was fed back into the LFSR in round 13. All
other differences, which were fed back, are either zero or the known ∆d.
We guess the individual value R−31,a for the first pair (K, IVa) which has 2
32
possibilities. From the value R−31,a we get with ∆R
−3
1 = ∆d the value R
−3
1,b for
the second pair (K, IVb). Furthermore, we obtain the two pairs (R−22,a, R
−2
2,b)
and (R−13,a, R
−1
3,b). We denote the now known difference ∆R
−2
2 with ∆k0, the
linear dependent ∆R−11 with ∆k1 and ∆R
−1
3 with ∆k2. This way we can
compute all differences of the LFSR because we know all differences coming
from the FSM. We have the following knowledge of differences for the FSM:
round clock t ∆Rt1 ∆Rt2 ∆Rt3
12 −3 ∆d 0 0
13 −2 ∆d ∆k0 0
14 −1 ∆k1 ∆k2
0
Starting step: From the first keystream equation and the update equa-
tions for ∆R01 and ∆R02 we receive
∆R−12 ⊕∆R02 = ∆z0 ⊕∆s015 ⊕∆k2 ⊕∆s−15 ⊕∆s00 ,
which gives, with the notation of Section 5.2.1 and the known right part
denoted as ∆k3, the equation
out
∆ S1(∆d)⊕
out
∆ S1(∆k1) = ∆k3 .
We multiply the equation with MC−11 and rewrite it in byte notation as
out
∆ SR(∆d(0))
out
∆ SR(∆d(1))
out
∆ SR(∆d(2))
out
∆ SR(∆d(3))
 ⊕

out
∆ SR(∆k
(0)
1 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(1)
1 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(2)
1 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(3)
1 )
 = MC−11 ·

∆k(0)3
∆k(1)3
∆k(2)3
∆k(3)3
 .
62 Chapter 5. Analysis of SNOW Resynchronization Mechanism
Then we check this equation line by line for each byte in a negligible time
complexity. The number of solutions will be 2
28·228
232
= 224 pairs (∆R−12 ,∆R
0
2)
which need 225 words of memory.
As expected we start the reduction step with the input-output diffe-
rence ∆R−21 → S1 → ∆R−12 . Since we start with 224 sequences, we have
exactly the same procedure as in the attack on 13 rounds on page 59 and
thus the same complexities. The same applies to the insertion step.
Results: The overall time complexity is the same as in the 13 round
case for each guess of R−31,a, which gives
232 · (227.1 + 224.5) ≈ 259.3
SNOW3G⊕ clocks. The memory requirements are 226 words and the key-
stream is of length 12 words for each IV.
Restriction: If we restrict the known difference∆d to one non-zero byte
only, we can reduce our attack complexity. We would start with guessing
the individual value R−31,a for the first pair (K, IVa) with 2
32 possibilities, as
explained above, and yield the same known differences of the FSM.
Then we proceed with the starting step as described. Due to the re-
striction only 2
7·228
232
= 23 pairs (∆R−12 ,∆R
0
2) satisfy the equation, which
require 24 words of memory.
During the reduction step the amount of sequences decreases to one.
We start with the input-output difference ∆R−21 → S1 → ∆R−12 and get the
individual values for 10 clocks in total. The time complexity is 26.5 clocks
and the memory will not exceed 26 words.
The insertion step is the same as in the 12 round case explained on
page 59 with a time complexity of 210 clocks.
Results: The total time complexity for this attack with the restriction
is
232 · (26.5 + 210) ≈ 242.1
SNOW3G⊕ clocks. The memory requirements are 26 words and the key-
stream is of length 12 words for each IV.
Reduced Initialization of 15 Rounds and 16 Rounds.
In the 15 round case two unknown differences∆R−32 and∆R
−2
2 were fed back
into the LFSR. We guess the individual values of R−41,a and R
−3
1,a for the first
pair (K, IVa) with complexity of 264. From the value R−41,a and ∆R
−4
1 = ∆d
we get the value of R−41,b and following the pairs (R
−3
2,a, R
−3
2,b) and (R
−2
3,a, R
−2
3,b).
Denote the known differences ∆R−32 by ∆k0, ∆R
−2
1 by ∆k1 and ∆R
−2
3 by
∆k2. From R−31,a and ∆R
−3
1 = ∆d we get the value of R
−3
1,b and following
the pairs (R−22,a, R
−2
2,b) and (R
−1
3,a, R
−1
3,b). Again, we denote the now known
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differences ∆R−22 by ∆k3, ∆R
−1
1 by ∆k4 and ∆R
−1
3 by ∆k5. This gives the
following differences for the FSM:
round clock t ∆Rt1 ∆Rt2 ∆Rt3
12 −4 ∆d 0 0
13 −3 ∆d ∆k0 0
14 −2 ∆k1 ∆k3 ∆k2
15 −1 ∆k4 ∆k5
0
We now have the same starting point as in the attack on 14 initialization
rounds described on page 61. For all three steps we proceed in the same way
as explained there.
Results: Since we guessed one more word in the beginning of the attack
the time complexity becomes
232 · 259.3 ≈ 291.3
SNOW3G⊕ clocks. The memory and keystream requirements remain.
A restriction of the ∆d is no longer useful because the value
out
∆ S1(∆d)
is not computed anymore.
In the 16 round case we guess one more word and then proceed as in the
attack on 15 rounds. The time complexity in SNOW3G⊕ clocks is
232 · 291.3 ≈ 2123.3
and the memory and keystream requirements remain.
The summary of our results is given in Table 5.1 with time in SNOW3G⊕
clocks and keystream and memory in words.
5.3 Known and Chosen IV Attacks on Versions of
SNOW2.0⊕
In this section we will show a known IV attack on SNOW2.0⊕ without
the FSM to LFSR feedback during the initialization phase. Afterwards, we
restore the feedback and present a chosen IV attack on SNOW2.0⊕ with
a reduced number of initialization rounds. Both attacks are similar to the
attacks on SNOW3G⊕ described in Section 5.2.
In both attacks on SNOW2.0⊕ the attacker has access to two keystreams
corresponding to (K, IVa) and (K, IVb), where IVa and IVb are either arbi-
trary known IVs or IVs chosen by the attacker. The goal is to recover the
internal state and thus the secret key from the known or chosen differences.
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target keystream time memory
SNOW3G⊕ without feedback 233 256.1 225
SNOW3G⊕ with feedback
12 initialization rounds 24 210.1 small
13 initialization rounds 24 227.3 226
with restriction of ∆d to 1 byte 24 210.1 small
14 initialization rounds 24 259.3 226
with restriction of ∆d to 1 byte 24 242.1 26
15 initialization rounds 24 291.3 226
16 initialization rounds 24 2123.3 226
Table 5.1: Summary of our known and chosen IV attacks on SNOW3G⊕
For the propagation of the differences through the S-box we refer to Sec-
tion 5.2.1 considering only the first S-box there.
All attacks have a similar structure, they begin with a starting step,
which is different for each attack, followed by a reduction step and then
finish with an insertion step.
In the starting step we either know or guess the first difference occur-
ring in the FSM and deduce the potential differences for the FSM words
using the next keystream equation. In the reduction step we reduce the
amount of possible differences to one using the keystream and update equa-
tions for the next clocks always performing the same check. In the insertion
step we compute the individual values for the differences in the FSM words,
insert them into one system of keystream equations and check for the right
insertion.
5.3.1 Known IV Attack without FSM to LFSR Feedback
In this section we consider a known IV attack on SNOW2.0⊕ without the
FSM to LFSR feedback, in which the attacker has access to two keystreams
corresponding to (K, IVa) and (K, IVb), where IVa and IVb are arbitrary
known IVs. This attack works for any number of initialization rounds.
During the keystream generation we have the following equations for the
differences at clock t:
∆zt = ∆st15 ⊕∆Rt1 ⊕∆Rt2 ⊕∆st0
∆Rt1 = ∆R
t−1
2 ⊕∆st−15
∆Rt2 =
out
∆ S1(∆Rt−11 ) .
The differences in the LFSR depend on the known difference of the IVs and
are completely predictable due to the linearity.
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The main procedures of our attack are: Guess ∆Rt1 at time t. Deduce
potential differences in the FSM words at different times from the linear evo-
lution of the difference in the LFSR and the keystream difference equations.
Knowing the input-output difference for the S-box, the few possibilities for
the individual values of the FSM words are deduced. Combine the knowledge
of the FSM state with that of the keystream to get linear equations on the
LFSR state. Collect enough equations to get a solvable linear system which
will recover the state of the LFSR. By the invertibility of the cipher run it
backwards to find the 128-bit secret key K.
Starting step: We guess at an arbitrary clock t = 1 the value of ∆R11
which gives us directly ∆R12 via the keystream equation of clock 1. Fur-
thermore, we get ∆R21 via the update equation of ∆R12 and with the next
keystream equation ∆R22. On the other hand, we know ∆R22 =
out
∆ S1(∆R11)
as explained in Section 5.2.1. Thus, we can check our guess for ∆R11 im-
mediately by combining the keystream equations of clock 1 and 2 with the
update equations for ∆R21 and ∆R22 yielding
out
∆ S1(∆R11)⊕∆R11 = ∆z2 ⊕∆s215 ⊕∆z1 ⊕∆s115 ⊕∆s10 ⊕∆s15 ⊕∆s20 .
We know the right part of this equation completely and denote it with ∆k0.
Let ∆R11 = v(0)‖v(1)‖v(2)‖v(3). We multiply the whole equation with MC−11
and receive it in byte form
out
∆ SR(v(0))
out
∆ SR(v(1))
out
∆ SR(v(2))
out
∆ SR(v(3))
 = MC−11 ·

v(0)
v(1)
v(2)
v(3)
 ⊕ MC−11 ·

∆k(0)0
∆k(1)0
∆k(2)0
∆k(3)0
 .
The values
out
∆ SR for the small S-box can be checked bytewise. We have
to insert all 232 possibilities for ∆R11 which results in a time complexity of
232 clocks. For each ∆R11 we have 228 possibilities for ∆R22 =
out
∆ S1(∆R11)
and therefore 2
32·228
232
= 228 pairs (∆R11,∆R22) remain after the check. The
memory requirements to store these pairs are 229 words. With the linear de-
pendencies of the differences we have 228 sequences (∆R11,∆R12,∆R21,∆R22).
Reduction step: For clock 3 we take the keystream equation and the
update equations for the FSM and obtain
∆R22 ⊕∆R32 = ∆z3 ⊕∆s315 ⊕∆s25 ⊕∆s30 .
Denoting the known right part with ∆k1 and using the notation of Sec-
tion 5.2.1 we get
∆R22⊕
out
∆ S1(∆R21) = ∆k1 .
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Let ∆R21 = w(0)‖w(1)‖w(2)‖w(3) and ∆R22 = x(0)‖x(1)‖x(2)‖x(3). We can
rewrite this equation into byte form
out
∆ SR(w(0))
out
∆ SR(w(1))
out
∆ SR(w(2))
out
∆ SR(w(3))
 = MC−11 ·

x(0)
x(1)
x(2)
x(3)
 ⊕ MC−11 ·

∆k(0)1
∆k(1)1
∆k(2)1
∆k(3)1
 .
We have to insert all 228 possibilities for (∆R21,∆R22), which requires a time
complexity of 228 clocks, and can check the values for
out
∆ SR as explained
before. The amount of 2
28·228
232
= 224 triples (∆R21,∆R22,∆R32) remains after
the check. With the linear dependencies of the differences we have 224 se-
quences (∆R11,∆R12,∆R21,∆R22,∆R31,∆R32). We can repeat this check until
we only have one sequence left. Since every check will reduce the number of
possibilities as well as the time complexity for the next check by 2−4, we will
need six more clocks. The time complexity for all seven checks together is∑6
i=0 2
28 · 2−4i ≈ 228.1. At the end, we only have one sequence (∆Ri1,∆Ri2)
left with i = 1, . . . , 9. For this sequence we need to compute (∆R101 ,∆R102 ).
Insertion step: Now we can switch from the differences to the individual
values for (Ri1, R
i+1
2 ), i = 1, . . . , 9. Each fixed input-output difference∆R
i
1 →
S1 → ∆Ri+12 has about 16.51 pairs (Ri1,a, Ri1,b) with i = 1, . . . , 9 as explained
in Section 5.2.1. We need the system of equations for one keystream only,
and insert always the first value of each pair. The clocks 1 to 9 are sufficient
to get 16 consecutive values for the LFSR. Altogether, we get 16.519 ≈ 236.4
possible insertions. Thus, we use 22 consecutive keystream equations starting
with clock 10 to verify which of the 236.4 possible insertions was correct.
Consequently, this insertion step has a time complexity of 236.4 clocks.
Results: In summary, our attack will have a time complexity of
232 + 232.1 + 236.4 ≈ 236.5
SNOW2.0⊕ clocks. We need 229 words of memory and 9+22 = 31 consecu-
tive words for both keystreams.
5.3.2 Differential Chosen IV Attacks
Now we look at SNOW2.0⊕ with the FSM to LFSR feedback during the
initialization but reduced number of initialization rounds. We show attacks
on 12 to 18 initialization rounds. All attacks are similar having the start-
ing step, which is slightly different for each number of initialization rounds,
followed by the reduction step and then finish with the insertion step.
We consider a differential chosen IV attack scenario. Assume that we have
two 128-bit IVs differing only in the most significant word IV0, which gives
the difference in s15 of the LFSR. We denote the difference in the IV word
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IV0 by ∆d. As we will see below we can restrict this difference to a single
byte of ∆d in order to reduce the complexity of our attacks. Until round 11
the difference will not affect the FSM. After round 11 the known ∆d enters
the FSM word R1. In this section we denote the first displayed keystream
word with z0 and increase the clock for the following keystream words. The
previous initialization rounds will have negative clocks. As described in Sec-
tion 5.1.2 the first computed keystream word is discarded. Hence, clock −1
will have no feedback from the FSM to the LFSR and no keystream word.
Reduced Initialization of 12 Rounds.
The differences in the LFSR values are known because so far all differences
in the FSM are zero and therefore no unknown difference was fed back into
the LFSR.
In the starting step we know ∆R01 = ∆d for the first keystream equa-
tion. Therefore, we know ∆R02 and consequentially ∆Rt1 and ∆Rt2 for all
clocks.
We do not need the reduction step because we already have only one se-
quence of differences. We simply compute all differences up to (∆R101 ,∆R102 )
via the update and keystream equations. Then we perform the insertion
step of the individual values for R1 and R2 as explained in the attack in
Section 5.3.1.
Results: Our attack has a time complexity of 236.4 SNOW2.0⊕ clocks,
memory requirements are small and we need 31 consecutive words for both
keystreams.
Reduced Initialization of 13 Rounds.
We extend the attack above by one more round. All differences in the FSM
are zero or the known ∆d until now. Therefore, no unknown difference was
fed back into the LFSR and all differences of the LFSR values are known.
Our knowledge of the differences in the FSM is shown in the following table:
round clock t ∆Rt1 ∆Rt2
12 −2 ∆d 0
13 −1 ∆d
0
Starting step: From the first keystream equation and the update equa-
tions for ∆R01 and ∆R02 with notation of Section 5.2.1 we get the equation
out
∆ S1(∆d)⊕
out
∆ S1(∆d) = ∆z0 ⊕∆s015 ⊕∆s−15 ⊕∆s00 .
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We denote the known part at the right side of this equation as ∆k0, multiply
the whole equation with MC−11 and gain the byte form equation
out
∆ SR(∆d(0))
out
∆ SR(∆d(1))
out
∆ SR(∆d(2))
out
∆ SR(∆d(3))
 ⊕

out
∆ SR(∆d(0))
out
∆ SR(∆d(1))
out
∆ SR(∆d(2))
out
∆ SR(∆d(3))
 = MC−11 ·

∆k(0)0
∆k(1)0
∆k(2)0
∆k(3)0
 .
We can check these four byte equations in a negligible time complexity as we
only have a few XORs. The number of solutions will be 2
28·228
232
= 224 pairs
(∆R−12 ,∆R
0
2) requiring 225 words of memory.
Reduction step: We start the check with the keystream and update
equations for clock 1 and have to insert all 224 pairs (∆R01,∆R02) similarly to
the reduction step in Section 5.3.1. Then we proceed for the next five clocks
until we only have one sequence (∆Ri1,∆Ri2) left with i = −1, . . . , 6. For
this sequence we compute the differences up to (∆R81,∆R82) via the update
and keystream equations. The time complexity for all six checks together is∑5
i=0 2
24 · 2−4i ≈ 224.1.
Insertion step: Our starting point for the computation of the individual
values for the FSM is the input-output difference∆R−11 → S1 → ∆R02. Then
we proceed as explained in the insertion step in Section 5.3.1.
Results: Altogether, the time complexity in SNOW2.0⊕ clocks is
224.1 + 236.4 ≈ 236.4 .
The memory requirements are 225 words and we need 31 consecutive words
for both keystreams.
Restriction: If we would restrict the known difference ∆d to a word
which has three bytes equal to zero and only one non-zero byte, we would
get only one pair after the starting step. Thus, we have no reduction
step and the same insertion step as in the attack on 12 rounds described
on page 67. There would be no influence on the time complexity and the
needed keystream because the insertion step is the expensive one, but we
could reduce the memory requirements to a small amount.
Reduced Initialization of 14 Rounds.
After 14 initialization rounds we have one unknown difference in the LFSR.
All other differences in the LFSR values are either zero or the known∆d. We
guess this unknown difference ∆R−22 =
out
∆ S1(∆d) which has 228 possibilities.
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We denote the now known ∆R−22 with ∆k0 and the linear dependent ∆R
−1
1
with ∆k1. This gives the following differences for the FSM:
round clock t ∆Rt1 ∆Rt2
12 −3 ∆d 0
13 −2 ∆d k0
14 −1 k1
0
With this knowledge of the FSM differences we are at the same starting point
as in the attack on 13 rounds on page 67.
Results: Thus, we would have the same memory and keystream require-
ments and the time complexity is
228 · 236.4 ≈ 264.4
SNOW2.0⊕ clocks due to the extra guess.
Consideration with more memory: If we consider the 228 extra possibil-
ities immediately in the starting step we would get 252 pairs (∆R−12 ,∆R
0
2)
which would need 253 words of memory. During the reduction step we
decrease this amount to one using 13 checks until clock 14. Afterwards, we
perform the insertion step with this single sequence. Then the time com-
plexity for the starting step is 237, for the reduction step it is 252.1, and for
the insertion step it remains. This concludes to a total time complexity of
252.1 clocks. The memory requirements are 253 words and the needed key-
stream remains.
Restriction: With the restriction of ∆d to a word with only one non-
zero byte we would have 23 pairs (∆R−12 ,∆R
0
2) after the starting step.
Thus, the time complexity for the starting step and the reduction step is
negligible, and for the insertion step it remains. This concludes to a total
time complexity of 236.4 SNOW2.0⊕ clocks. The memory requirements are
small and the needed keystream remains.
Reduced Initialization up to 18 Rounds.
We can pursue these attacks for the next four rounds until initialization
round 18. Prior to the starting step we would have to guess all unknown
differences which were fed back into the LFSR. Then we are always at the
same starting point as described in the 14 round case before. The restric-
tion of ∆d to a word with only one non-zero byte reduces the complexities
in all these cases. The consideration with more memory, as explained in
the 14 round case before, is applicable with or without the restriction for all
cases.
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The summary of our results is given in Table 5.2 with time in SNOW2.0⊕
clocks and keystream and memory in words. If one of the requirements
exceeds 2128 the attempt is not considered as a promising attack anymore.
target keystream time memory
SNOW2.0⊕ without feedback 62 236.5 230
SNOW2.0⊕ with feedback
12 initialization rounds 62 236.4 small
13 initialization rounds 62 236.4 225
with restriction of ∆d to 1 byte 62 236.4 small
14 initialization rounds 62 264.4 225
with more memory 62 252.1 253
with restriction of ∆d to 1 byte 62 236.4 small
15 initialization rounds 62 292.4 225
with more memory 62 280.1 281
with restriction of ∆d to 1 byte 62 250.4 225
with restriction and more memory 62 238.4 239
16 initialization rounds
with more memory 62 2108.1 2109
with restriction of ∆d to 1 byte 62 278.4 225
with restriction and more memory 62 266 267
17 initialization rounds
with restriction of ∆d to 1 byte 62 2106.4 225
with restriction and more memory 62 294 295
18 initialization rounds
with restriction and more memory 62 2122 2123
Table 5.2: Summary of our known and chosen IV attacks on SNOW2.0⊕
5.4 Summary
In the first half of this chapter we have shown known IV and chosen IV
resynchronization attacks on SNOW3G⊕. We can attack any amount of
initialization rounds of SNOW3G⊕ if there is no feedback from FSM to
LFSR. With such feedback we show key-recovery attacks up to 16 rounds
of initialization and use only a few keystream words. Our results indicate
that about half of the initialization rounds of SNOW3G⊕ might succumb
to chosen IV resynchronization attacks. However, the remaining security
margin is quite significant and thus these attacks pose no threat to the
security of SNOW3G itself. In the second half we have shown known IV and
chosen IV resynchronization attacks on SNOW2.0⊕. Likewise, we can attack
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any amount of initialization rounds of SNOW2.0⊕ if there is no feedback
from FSM to LFSR. With such feedback we are able to mount key-recovery
attacks up to 18 rounds of initialization using only a few keystream words.
This shows that more than half of the initialization rounds of SNOW2.0⊕
succumb to chosen IV resynchronization attacks. However, the remaining
security margin is big enough and thus these attacks pose no threat to the
security of SNOW2.0 itself.
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Chapter 6
Attacks on Simplified Versions
of K2
The stream cipher K2 was proposed by Kiyomoto, Tanaka and Sakurai at
SECRYPT 2007 [KTS07]. Currently it is submitted to the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) for standardization.
A security evaluation is given in [BPR11] with the conclusion that no
weaknesses were found. The attack idea of [BHNS10] on SNOW3G is
applicable to K2 as well. Some side-channel attacks are applied on K2
in [HYY+10] showing that K2 offers reasonable resistance to side-channel
attacks even without countermeasures.
In this chapter we present two attacks on simplified versions of K2. We
show a differential chosen IV attack with key-recovery on simplified versions
with five, six and seven initialization clocks with time complexity of 210.05,
218.05 and 247.05 clocks. The needed keystream amounts to 28 words for the
attacks on five and six initialization clocks and 24 words for the attack on
seven initialization clocks. For a simplified version with seven initialization
clocks we show a distinguishing attack with a time complexity of 227.6 clocks,
needed keystream of 232 words and negligible memory requirements.
This chapter is organized as follows. We give a description of the cipher
K2 and its simplification K2⊕ in Section 6.1. The differential chosen IV
attack with key-recovery on K2⊕ with five, six and seven initialization clocks
is presented in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 we describe the distinguishing
attack on K2⊕ with seven initialization clocks. Some conclusions are given
in Section 6.4.
6.1 Description of K2 and K2⊕
Kiyomoto, Tanaka and Sakurai proposed the stream cipher K2 at SECRYPT
2007 [KTS07]. It consists of two Feedback Shift Registers (FSR), a Dy-
namic Feedback Controller (DFC), which dynamically chooses between four
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different feedback functions, and a Non-Linear Function (NLF) as shown in
Figure 6.1.
α0
Sub SubSub Sub
DFC
1
or
α3
0 2 43
L2
L1
R2
R1
zL
FSR-A
FSR-B
NLF
zH
1
7 5 3 210 9 8 6 4 1 0
α1
or
α2
Figure 6.1: Keystream generation of K2
The first FSR, called FSR−A, has five words (a4, . . . , a0) each of size 32
bit. The feedback function is
at4 = α0a
t−1
0 ⊕ at−13
where the multiplier α0 is a constant chosen as the root of an irreducible
polynomial of fourth degree in GF (28)[x]. The second FSR, called FSR−B,
has eleven words (b10, . . . , b0) each of size 32 bit. The feedback function of
FSR−B is selected by the DFC. This controller has two clock control bits
cl1 and cl2 which are described as
cl1t = at2[30] and cl2t = a
t
2[31]
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with at2[30] being the second most significant bit (smsb) of at2 and at2[31]
being the most significant bit (msb) of at2. Then the feedback function of
the FSR−B is
bt10 = (α
cl1t−1
1 + α
1−cl1t−1
2 − 1)bt−10 ⊕ bt−11 ⊕ bt−16 ⊕ αcl2t−13 bt−18
where the multipliers α(1,2,3) are constants each one chosen as the root of a
different irreducible polynomial of fourth degree in GF (28)[x]. The NLF has
four words memory (L1, L2, R1, R2) and four times a Sub function. This
Sub function operates on a word and uses the 8-bit AES S-box [DR02] and
the AES MixColumns operation over GF (28) defined by x8+x4+x3+x+1.
The exact work flow for a word w = w(0)‖w(1)‖w(2)‖w(3) with w(0) being the
most and w(3) being the least significant bytes is
Sub(w) =MC ·
[
S(w(0)), S(w(1)), S(w(2)), S(w(3))
]T
with S denoting the AES S-box and MC the MixColumns operation. With
each clock the output of the NLF is the keystream of two words (zHt , zLt )
computed as
zHt = (b
t
10¢ L2t) ⊕L1t ⊕ at0
zLt = (b
t
0 ¢R2t)⊕R1t ⊕ at4 .
The symbol ’⊕’ denotes the bitwise XOR and the symbol ’¢’ denotes the
addition modulo 232. To update the memory words of the NLF compute
L1t = Sub(R2t−1¢ bt−14 ) L2t = Sub(L1t−1)
R1t = Sub(L2t−1 ¢ bt−19 ) R2t = Sub(R1t−1) .
The K2 cipher uses a four word keyK = [K0,K1,K2,K3] and a four word
IV = [IV0, IV1, IV2, IV3]. For the loading step two intermediate results are
computed using the Sub function
S1 = Sub[(K3 ¿ 8)⊕ (K3 À 24)]⊕ 0x01000000
S2 = Sub[((K0 ⊕K1 ⊕K2 ⊕K3 ⊕ S1)¿ 8)
⊕((K0 ⊕K1 ⊕K2 ⊕K3 ⊕ S1)À 24)]⊕ 0x02000000 ,
the constants at the end are given in hexadecimal numbers. Afterwards, the
FSRs are loaded
a0 = K0 ⊕ S1 b3 = IV1
a1 = K3 b4 = K0 ⊕ S1⊕ S2
a2 = K2 b5 = K1 ⊕ S2
a3 = K1 b6 = IV2
a4 = K0 b7 = IV3
b0 = K0 ⊕K2 ⊕ S1⊕ S2 b8 = K0 ⊕K1 ⊕K2 ⊕K3 ⊕ S1
b1 = K1 ⊕K3 ⊕ S2 b9 = K0 ⊕K1 ⊕ S1
b2 = IV0 b10 = K0 ⊕K1 ⊕K2 ⊕ S1 .
The four memory words of the NLF are initialized with zero. Then, during
the initialization the cipher is clocked 24 times doing
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1. get the output from the NLF (zHt , zLt ),
2. update the NLF,
3. update FSR−B with zHt is XORed to the new word of FSR−B,
4. update FSR−A with zLt is XORed to the new word of FSR−A.
After this initialization the K2 cipher produces the keystream and the
FSRs are updated without feedback from the NLF.
For the rest of this chapter we consider a simplified version of K2 where
all additions modulo 232 are replaced with XOR and denote this version with
K2⊕.
We measure the time complexity for our attacks in K2⊕ clocks.
6.2 Differential Chosen IV Attack with Key-Recovery
Considering a differential chosen IV scenario, we choose two different IVs
IVa and IVb. We know the keystream from both pairs (K, IVa) and (K, IVb)
with unknown key K. Both IVs only differ in IV word IV1 which takes the
longest until it enters the NLF. We denote this chosen difference with ∆d.
The DFC always takes the msb and smsb of a2. Thus, we do not want to
have a difference there. Accordingly, we choose the starting difference ∆d
with msb and smsb equal to zero. Our goal is to recover the whole internal
state right after the loading step which means we get the unknown key K.
We denote the first displayed keystream words with zH0 and zL0 and in-
crease the clock for the following keystream words. The previous initializa-
tion clocks will have negative clocks.
6.2.1 Difference Propagation through the S-boxes
From the differences in the keystream and the partially known differences
in the FSRs we compute the differences in the words of the NLF. We then
need to know how the differences in the NLF words propagate through the
Sub function. Let va, vb, wa, wb be arbitrary words at different times t with
the following equations:
∆v = va ⊕ vb wa = Sub(va) wb = Sub(vb)
∆w = wa ⊕ wb = Sub(va)⊕ Sub(vb) .
We define a new notation
out
∆ Sub(∆v)
def.= Sub(va)⊕ Sub(vb) .
In the same way we define a new notation for the AES S-box S. Let
xa, xb, ya, yb be arbitrary bytes at different times t with the following equa-
tions:
∆x = xa ⊕ xb ya = S(xa) yb = S(xb)
∆y = ya ⊕ yb = S(xa)⊕ S(xb) .
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Then the new notation is
out
∆ S(∆x)
def.= S(xa)⊕ S(xb) .
During the keystream generation we have the following equations for the
differences at clock t:
∆zHt = ∆b
t
10⊕∆L1t ⊕∆L2t ⊕∆at0
∆zLt = ∆b
t
0 ⊕∆R1t⊕∆R2t⊕∆at4
∆L1t =
out
∆ Sub (∆R2t−1 ⊕∆bt−14 ) ∆R1t =
out
∆ Sub (∆L2t−1 ⊕∆bt−19 )
∆L2t =
out
∆ Sub (∆L1t−1) ∆R2t =
out
∆ Sub (∆R1t−1) .
We define two notations for the XORed sums in the Sub functions at time
t− 1
∆Rbt−1 def.= (∆R2t−1 ⊕∆bt−14 ) and ∆Lbt−1 def.= (∆L2t−1 ⊕∆bt−19 ) .
Any fixed input difference ∆Rbt−1 6= 0 results in nearly 228 possible
output differences for ∆L1t, because any input difference in the small 8-bit
AES S-box S results in 127 possible output differences. If we know or fix
the input-output difference of Sub meaning ∆Rbt−1 → Sub → ∆L1t, we
can recover on average (2 · 126127 + 4 · 1127)4 ≈ 16.51 pairs of individual values
(Rbt−1a , Rb
t−1
b ) for Sub. Due to the difference propagation in the small S-
box S, we have 2 · 126127 + 4 · 1127 ≈ 2.02 pairs on byte level. From the pair
(Rbt−1a , Rb
t−1
b ) we obtain (L1
t
a, L1
t
b) and (L2
t+1
a , L2
t+1
b ), too, after applying
the Sub function once and twice. This means that we have 16.512 ≈ 8.255
possible values for ∆L2t+1. If we know or fix this difference as well, we have
only two pairs of individual values left which satisfy the sequence ∆Rbt−1 →
Sub→ ∆L1t → Sub→ ∆L2t+1, namely (Rbt−1a , Rbt−1b ) and (Rbt−1b , Rbt−1a ).
For a fixed input-output difference ∆Lbt−1 → Sub → ∆R1t we can
recover on average 16.51 pairs of individual values (Lbt−1a , Lb
t−1
b ) for Sub
in the same way as described above resulting in 8.255 possible values for
∆R2t+1. Similarly, with this difference known or fixed we have only two
pairs of individual values remaining which satisfy the sequence ∆Lbt−1 →
Sub→ ∆R1t → Sub→ ∆R2t+1, namely (Lbt−1a , Lbt−1b ) and (Lbt−1b , Lbt−1a ).
If we have collected enough individual values for the NLF, we can derive
some words for FSR−B from the update equations L1t = Sub(R2t−1⊕bt−14 )
and R1t = Sub(L2t−1 ⊕ bt−19 ) of the NLF. The insertion of the individual
values of the NLF together with some words of FSR−B in the keystream
equations yields some words for FSR−A. At the end, we know enough words
of the NLF, FSR−B and FSR−A to clock backwards and reveal the secret
key.
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6.2.2 Reduced Initialization of 5 Clocks
We reduce the number of initialization clocks of K2⊕ to five. In the 5th
initialization clock the starting difference ∆d enters the word R1 of the
NLF. During the keystream computation there is no more feedback from the
NLF to the FSRs anymore. Therefore, we know all differences of FSR−A
as ∆d enters it in clock 4 and then propagates linearly. For FSR−B the
computation of the differences only depends on the unknown bits of the
DFC which select the multipliers for the FSR−B feedback.
The propagation of the chosen difference ∆d during the five initialization
clocks is shown in Table 6.1. We omit the zero differences and write a
question mark for unknown differences. The work flow of K2 has two steps,
first computing the keystream words, then updating the internal state. The
first row in Table 6.1 only shows the starting state. Then each row shows
the updated state of K2⊕. Thus, the first keystream words are computed
from the values in the last row of this table.
clock FSR-B FSR-A NLF
ini 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 4 3 2 1 0 L1 L2 R1 R2
d
1 d
2 d
3 d d
4 ? d d
5 ? ? d d d ?
Table 6.1: Propagation of the difference d through K2⊕ during the five ini-
tialization clocks
The differences of the keystream words for clock 0 are
∆zH0 = ∆b
0
10⊕∆L10 ⊕∆L20 ⊕∆a00
∆zL0 = ∆b
0
0 ⊕∆R10⊕∆R20⊕∆a04 ,
where the differences in ∆L10,∆L20,∆a00,∆b00,∆R20 are all equal to zero
and ∆a04 = ∆d. Hence, we know ∆b010 and ∆R10. The update equation of
FSR−B implies ∆b010 = ∆b−110 = ∆b09 and ∆b010 = ∆b19. Furthermore, we
know ∆Lb−1 = ∆L2t−1 ⊕∆bt−19 = 0⊕∆d and ∆R10 which fixes the input-
output difference ∆Lb−1 → Sub→ ∆R10. As explained in Section 6.2.1 we
can recover on average 16.51 pairs of individual values for Sub resulting in
8.255 possible values for ∆R21.
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Clock 1 gives us ∆zH1 = ∆b110 = ∆b29 because all other differences are
zero. For ∆zL1 we can rewrite the keystream equation in the following way:
∆zL1 = ∆b
1
0 ⊕∆R11 ⊕∆R21 ⊕∆a14
⇔ ∆R11 = ∆b10 ⊕∆R21 ⊕∆a14 ⊕∆zL1
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆L20 ⊕∆b09) = 0⊕∆R21 ⊕∆d⊕∆zL1
⇔ out∆ Sub(0⊕∆b09) = ∆R21 ⊕∆k0 ,
so that we know all differences at the right side with ∆k0 = ∆d⊕∆zL1 . Let
∆b09 = v
(0)‖v(1)‖v(2)‖v(3) and ∆R21 = w(0)‖w(1)‖w(2)‖w(3). We can undo
the MixColumns and yield the equation in byte form
out
∆ S(v(0))
out
∆ S(v(1))
out
∆ S(v(2))
out
∆ S(v(3))
 = MC−11 ·

w(0)
w(1)
w(2)
w(3)
 ⊕ MC−11 ·

∆k(0)0
∆k(1)0
∆k(2)0
∆k(3)0
 .
Then we insert all 8.255 possibilities of∆R21 and check byte by byte whether
the computed value on the right side is a valid difference for the left side. The
time complexity for this check is two clocks and only one pair (∆R11,∆R21)
will remain due to 2
28·8.255
232
< 1. The known difference ∆R21 fixes the
difference sequence ∆Lb−1 → Sub → ∆R10 → Sub → ∆R21 leaving
only two pairs of individual values satisfying it. Furthermore, we know
∆Lb0 = ∆L20 ⊕ ∆b09 = 0 ⊕ ∆d and ∆R11 which fixes the input-output
difference ∆Lb0 → Sub → ∆R11. Thus, we can recover nearly 16.51 pairs
of individual values following 8.255 possible differences for ∆R22.
In clock 2 ∆b210 has two possibilities because in its update equation
∆b210 = (α
cl11
1 + α
1−cl11
2 − 1)∆b10 ⊕∆b11 ⊕∆b16 ⊕ αcl213 ∆b18 ,
all differences are equal to zero except for ∆b18. The DFC takes cl21 to
select the multiplier. We have a zero in the msb of ∆a12 = ∆d and following
∆b210 = ∆b
1
8 or ∆b210 = α3∆b18. We can rewrite the keystream equation in
the following way:
∆zH2 = ∆b
2
10 ⊕∆L12 ⊕∆L22 ⊕∆a20
⇔ ∆L12 = ∆b210 ⊕∆L22 ⊕∆a20 ⊕∆zH2
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆R21 ⊕∆b14) = ∆b210 ⊕ 0⊕ 0⊕∆zH2
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆R21 ⊕ 0) = ∆b210 ⊕∆zH2 ,
so that we know all differences at the right side. We insert both possibilities
for ∆b210, undo the MixColumns operation and check bytewise whether the
computed value on the right side is a valid difference for the left side. The
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time complexity for this check is a half clock and only one pair (∆b210,∆L12)
will remain. We know ∆Rb1 = ∆R21 ⊕∆b14 = ∆R21 ⊕ 0 and ∆L12 which
fixes the input-output difference ∆Rb1 → Sub→ ∆L12. Therefore, we have
nearly 16.51 pairs of individual values following 8.255 possibilities for ∆L23.
For ∆zL2 we do exactly the same as described for ∆zL1 at clock 1 receiving
known values for ∆R11 and ∆R22 as well as 8.255 possibilities for ∆R23.
For clock 3 we have two possibilities for ∆b310 and 8.255 possibilities for
∆L23. Thus, we rewrite the equation
∆zH3 = ∆b
3
10 ⊕∆L13 ⊕∆L23 ⊕∆a30
⇔ ∆L13 = ∆b310 ⊕∆L23 ⊕∆a30 ⊕∆zH3
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆R22 ⊕∆b24) = ∆b310 ⊕∆L23 ⊕∆d⊕∆zH3
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆R22 ⊕ 0) = ∆b310 ⊕∆L23 ⊕∆d⊕∆zH3 ,
insert all listed possibilities, undo the MixColumns operation and check byte
by byte. The time complexity for this check is four clocks and only one triple
(∆b310,∆L1
3,∆L23) will remain due to 2
28·2·8.255
232
≈ 1. Furthermore, we know
∆Rb2 = ∆R22 ⊕∆b24 = ∆R22 ⊕ 0 and ∆L13 which fixes the input-output
difference∆Rb2 → Sub→ ∆L13. Thus, we can recover 8.255 possibilities for
∆L24. In addition, the known difference ∆L23 fixes the difference sequence
∆Rb1 → Sub→ ∆L12 → Sub→ ∆L23 yielding only two pairs of individual
values satisfying it. For ∆zL3 we do exactly the same as described for ∆zL1
at clock 1 receiving known values for ∆R12 and ∆R23 as well as 8.255
possibilities for ∆R24.
In clock 4, 5 and 6 we do exactly the same as described for clock 3.
Now we have collected enough individual values for the NLF. So far, the
time complexity is 2 + 12 + 2 + 4 · (4 + 2) = 28.5 clocks.
For each key-IV pair we have a system of keystream and update equa-
tions. We select one of them for the insertion of these individual values. Since
we collected 20 pairs of individual values, always two pairs for one difference,
we take the first value of a pair to be inserted in the system of equations.
Wrong allocations will have contradictions somewhere in the equations or at
least in the keystream for clock 7 and are dispelled this way. This would
result in a time complexity of 210 clocks. For the right allocation at clock 6
we can clock backwards and receive the secret key with time complexity of
six clocks.
The overall time complexity in K2⊕ clocks is
28.5 + 210 + 6 ≈ 210.05 .
The needed keystream amounts to two words per clock for seven clocks
for each pair (K, IVa) and (K, IVb) which yields 28 keystream words. The
memory requirements are roughly 30 words.
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6.2.3 Reduced Initialization of 6 Clocks
We extend the previous attack by one more clock. In the 5th initialization
clock the starting difference ∆d enters the word R1 of the NLF resulting in
an unknown difference ∆R1−1, which is fed back into FSR−A. We guess
∆R1−1 with ∆R1−1 =
out
∆ Sub(∆L2−2 ⊕∆b−29 ) =
out
∆ Sub(0⊕∆d). Thus, we
know the input difference and have 228 possibilities for the output difference
∆R1−1. We can only employ those ∆R1−1 which have msb and smsb equal
to zero because otherwise we will have differences in the bits for the DFC.
This reduces the possibilities for ∆R1−1 to 226 but we have to try the whole
attack 22 times to let the case msb=smsb=0 happen. We denote the now
known ∆R1−1 with ∆k0.
During the keystream computation there is no more feedback from the
NLF to the FSRs anymore. Therefore, we know all differences of FSR−A
as ∆d enters it in clock 4, ∆k0 enters it in clock 6 and both propagate
linearly. For FSR−B the computation of the differences only depends on
the unknown bits of the DFC which select the multipliers for the FSR−B
feedback. We have to guess the difference ∆b−210 = ∆b
−1
10 because we need
this difference for the update equations of the NLF as well as for the feedback
function of FSR−B. The difference ∆b−210 = ∆b−110 has only two possibilities
due to the fact that in its update equation all differences are zero except for
∆b−30 = ∆d. For this difference we need to guess the choice of the multiplier
which depends on the smsb of a−32 . We denote the now known ∆b
−2
10 = ∆b
−1
10
with ∆k1.
Table 6.2 shows the propagation of ∆d and all guessed differences. Zero
differences are omitted and unknown differences are noted with question
marks.
clock FSR-B FSR-A NLF
ini 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 4 3 2 1 0 L1 L2 R1 R2
d
1 d
2 d
3 d d
4 k1 d d
5 k1 k1 d d d k0
6 ? k1 k1 d k0 d d ? ?
Table 6.2: Propagation of the differences ∆d,∆k0 and ∆k1 through K2⊕
during the six initialization clocks
The differences of the keystream words for clock 0 are
∆zH0 = ∆b
0
10⊕∆L10 ⊕∆L20 ⊕∆a00
∆zL0 = ∆b
0
0 ⊕∆R10⊕∆R20⊕∆a04 ,
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where the differences in ∆L10, ∆L20, ∆a00, ∆b00 are zero, and ∆a04 = ∆k0.
Hence, we know ∆b010. As ∆R1−1 = ∆k0 is fixed we know the input-output
difference ∆Lb−2 → Sub → ∆R1−1 = ∆k0. Thus, we can recover on av-
erage 16.51 pairs of individual values for this sequence resulting in 8.255
possibilities for ∆R20. For ∆zL0 we can rewrite the keystream equation in
the following way:
∆zL0 = ∆b
0
0 ⊕∆R10 ⊕∆R20 ⊕∆a04
⇔ ∆R10 = ∆b00 ⊕∆R20 ⊕∆a04 ⊕∆zL0
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆L2−1 ⊕∆b−19 ) = 0⊕∆R20 ⊕∆k0 ⊕∆zL0
⇔ out∆ Sub(0⊕∆k1) = ∆R20 ⊕∆k0 ⊕∆zL0 .
Then we can insert all 8.255 possibilities for ∆R20, undo the MixColumns
operation and check bytewise whether the value on the right side is a valid
difference for the left side. The time complexity for this check is two clocks
and only one pair (∆R10,∆R20) will survive due to 2
28·8.255
232
< 1. The
∆R20 leaves only two pairs of individual values which fulfills the sequence
∆Lb−2 → Sub → ∆R1−1 = ∆k0 → Sub → ∆R20. The ∆R10 fixes the
input-output difference ∆Lb−1 → Sub → ∆R10 resulting in nearly 16.51
pairs of individual values following 8.255 possible differences for ∆R21.
In clock 1 ∆b110 has two possibilities because in its update equation
∆b110 = (α
cl10
1 + α
1−cl10
2 − 1)∆b00 ⊕∆b01 ⊕∆b06 ⊕ αcl203 ∆b08 ,
all differences are equal to zero except for ∆b08. Hence, we have ∆b110 = ∆b08
or ∆b110 = α3∆b08 because we have a zero in the msb of ∆a02 = ∆d. We can
rewrite the keystream equation in the following way:
∆zH1 = ∆b
1
10 ⊕∆L11 ⊕∆L21 ⊕∆a10
⇔ ∆L11 = ∆b110 ⊕∆L21 ⊕∆a10 ⊕∆zH1
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆R20 ⊕∆b04) = ∆b110 ⊕ 0⊕∆d⊕∆zH1
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆R20 ⊕ 0) = ∆b110 ⊕∆d⊕∆zH1 ,
so that we know all differences at the right side. We insert both possibilities
for ∆b110, undo the MixColumns operation and check bytewise whether the
value on the right side is a valid one for the left side. The time complexity
for this check is a half clock and only one pair (∆b110,∆L11) will remain.
The ∆L11 fixes the input-output difference ∆Rb0 → Sub → ∆L11 which
results in nearly 16.51 pairs of individual values following 8.255 possibilities
for ∆L22. For ∆zL1 we do exactly the same as described for ∆zL0 at clock 0.
For clock 2 we have two possibilities for ∆b210 and 8.255 possibilities for
∆L22. Thus, we rewrite the equation
∆zH2 = ∆b
2
10 ⊕∆L12 ⊕∆L22 ⊕∆a20
⇔ ∆L12 = ∆b210 ⊕∆L22 ⊕∆a20 ⊕∆zH2
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆R21 ⊕∆b14) = ∆b210 ⊕∆L22 ⊕∆d⊕∆zH2
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆R21 ⊕ 0) = ∆b210 ⊕∆L22 ⊕∆d⊕∆zH2 ,
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insert all listed possibilities, undo the MixColumns operation and check byte
by byte. The time complexity for this check is four clocks and only one triple
(∆b210,∆L1
2,∆L22) will remain due to 2
28·2·8.255
232
≈ 1. The difference ∆L12
fixes the sequence ∆Rb1 → Sub→ ∆L12 which results in 8.255 possibilities
for ∆L23. The known difference ∆L22 fixes the pair of individual values
for the sequence ∆Rb0 → Sub → ∆L11 → Sub → ∆L22. For ∆zL2 we do
exactly the same as described for ∆zL0 at clock 0.
For the clocks 3, 4 and 5 we do exactly the same as described for clock 2.
Now we have collected enough individual values for the NLF. So far, the
time complexity is 2+ 12+2+4 ·(4+2) = 28.5 clocks. It is the same as for the
computations for five initialization clocks as we executed similar equations.
For each key-IV pair we have a system of keystream and update equa-
tions. We select one of them for the insertion of these individual values. Since
we collected 20 pairs of individual values, always two pairs for one difference,
we take the first value of a pair to be inserted in the system of equations.
Wrong allocations will have contradictions somewhere in the equations or at
least in the keystream for clock 7 and are dispelled this way. This would
result in a time complexity of 210 clocks. For the right allocation at clock 6
we can clock backwards and receive the secret key with a time complexity
of six clocks.
At the beginning we guessed ∆R1−1 with 226 possibilities and ∆b−210 with
two possibilities. Since we have the constraint on∆R1−1 with msb=smsb=0,
we have to execute our attack 22 times (for example with different ∆d) that
this case happens. The overall time complexity in K2⊕ clocks is
22 · 226 · 2 · (28.5 + 210 + 6) ≈ 239.05 .
The needed keystream amounts to two words per clock for seven clocks
for each pair (K, IVa) and (K, IVb) which yields 28 keystream words. The
memory requirements are roughly 30 words.
If we would restrict the difference ∆d to a word with three bytes equal
to zero and one non-zero byte, we would get a time complexity of
22 · 25 · 2 · (28.5 + 210 + 6) ≈ 218.05
K2⊕ clocks. The keystream and memory requirements remain.
6.2.4 Reduced Initialization of 7 Clocks
Now we want to extend the attack to seven initialization clocks. The big
problem is the feedback from the NLF to FSR−A and the DFC. Table 6.3
shows the propagation of difference ∆d and all unknown differences as ques-
tion marks. Before we can start with any computation we have to guess
some differences to get rid of some question marks in this table.
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clock FSR-B FSR-A NLF
ini 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 4 3 2 1 0 L1 L2 R1 R2
d
1 d
2 d
3 d d
4 ? d d
5 ? ? d d d ?
6 ? ? ? d ? d d ? ?
7 ? ? ? ? d ? ? d d ? ? ?
Table 6.3: Propagation of the difference ∆d through K2⊕ during the seven
initialization clocks
For FSR−B we need to guess ∆b−310 of initialization clock 4. In its update
equation all differences are zero except for ∆b−40 = ∆d, for which we need to
guess the choice of the multiplier which depends on the smsb of a−42 . Thus,
we have two possibilities for ∆b−310 . We denote the guessed ∆b
−3
10 with ∆k0.
From the update equations we derive ∆b−210 = ∆b
−3
10 = ∆k0. Similarly, we
have to guess ∆b−110 with two possibilities and denote it with ∆k1.
For the NLF we need to guess ∆R1−2 because it is fed back into FSR−A.
We have ∆R1−2 =
out
∆ Sub(∆L2−3 ⊕ ∆b−39 ) =
out
∆ Sub(0 ⊕ ∆d). Thus, we
know the input difference and have 228 possibilities for the output diffe-
rence ∆R1−2. We can only employ those values of ∆R1−2 which have
msb and smsb equal to zero because otherwise we will have differences
in the bits for the DFC. This reduces the possibilities for ∆R1−2 to 226
but we have to try the whole attack 22 times to let the case msb=smsb=0
happen. We denote the guessed ∆R1−2 with ∆k2. This fixes the input-
output difference ∆Lb−3 → Sub → ∆R1−2 = ∆k2 yielding 16.51 pairs
of individual values and following 8.255 possibilities for ∆R2−1. Further-
more, we guess ∆R1−1 with 228 possibilities due to the known input dif-
ference in ∆R1−1 =
out
∆ Sub(∆L2−2 ⊕ ∆b−29 ) =
out
∆ Sub(0 ⊕ ∆k0). The sum
∆R1−1 ⊕∆R2−1 must have a zero in the msb and smsb because we do not
want to have a difference in the bits for the DFC. This reduces the possi-
bilities for ∆R1−1 to 226 but we have to execute our attack 22 more times.
We denote the guessed ∆R1−1 with ∆k3. This determines the input-output
difference ∆Lb−2 → Sub→ ∆R1−1 = ∆k3 yielding 16.51 pairs of individual
values and 8.255 possibilities for ∆R20.
We update Table 6.3 with all guessed differences and get Table 6.4.
Now we have a look at the keystream equations for clock 0. The difference
∆b010 has two possibilities because in its update equation we need to guess
the multiplier for ∆b−18 depending on the msb of a
−1
2 . We can rewrite the
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clock FSR-B FSR-A NLF
ini 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 4 3 2 1 0 L1 L2 R1 R2
d
1 d
2 d
3 d d
4 k0 d d
5 k0 k0 d d d k2
6 k1 k0 k0 d k2 d d k3 ?
7 ? k1 k0 k0 d ? k2 d d ? ? ?
Table 6.4: Propagation of the known or guessed differences through K2⊕
during the seven initialization clocks
equation for ∆zH0 in the following way:
∆zH0 = ∆b
0
10 ⊕∆L10 ⊕∆L20 ⊕∆a00
⇔ ∆L10 = ∆b010 ⊕∆L20 ⊕∆a00 ⊕∆zH0
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆R2−1 ⊕∆b−14 ) = ∆b010 ⊕ 0⊕ 0⊕∆zH0
⇔ out∆ Sub(∆R2−1 ⊕ 0) = ∆b010 ⊕∆zH0 .
We insert the 8.255 possibilities for ∆R2−1 and the two possibilities for
∆b010. Afterwards, we undo the MixColumns operation and check bytewise
whether the value at the right side is a valid one for the left side. The time
complexity is about four clocks and only one triple (∆L10,∆R2−1,∆b010)
will remain due to 2
28·2·8.255
232
≈ 1. The ∆L10 fixes the input-output dif-
ference ∆Rb−1 → Sub → ∆L10 which results in 8.255 possibilities for
∆L21. The ∆R2−1 determines the two pairs of individual values for the
sequence ∆Lb−3 → Sub → ∆R1−2 → Sub → ∆R2−1. Also, ∆R2−1 fixes
∆a04 = ∆a3−1 ⊕ ∆R2−1 ⊕ ∆R1−1 ⊕ ∆a−14 . For ∆zL0 we know the input
difference for ∆R10 =
out
∆ Sub(∆L2−1 ⊕∆b−19 ) =
out
∆ Sub(0 ⊕∆k0) as well as
the 8.255 possibilities for ∆R20 and ∆a04. Therefore, we can do exactly the
same as described for ∆zL0 at clock 0 in the attack on six initialization clocks
on page 82. From now on all differences in FSR−A are known and propagate
linearly because there is no more feedback from the NLF to FSR−A.
For the clocks from 1 to 4 we perform the same computations as for
clock 2 in the attack on six initialization clocks described on page 82. For
clock 5 we discard ∆zH5 because we might have msb6=0 and / or smsb6=0 for
∆a42 which results in differences in the DFC. For ∆zL5 we do the same as in
the previous clocks.
Now we have collected enough individual values for the NLF. So far, the
time complexity for the computations is 4 + 4 · (4 + 2) + 2 = 30 clocks.
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For each key-IV pair we have a system of keystream and update equa-
tions. We select one of them for the insertion of these individual values. Since
we collected 20 pairs of individual values, always two pairs for one difference,
we take the first value of a pair to be inserted in the system of equations.
Wrong allocations will have contradictions somewhere in the equations or at
least in the keystream for clock 6 and are dispelled this way. This would
result in a time complexity of 210 clocks. For the right allocation at clock 0
we can clock backwards and receive the secret key with time complexity of
seven clocks.
At the beginning we guessed ∆b−310 and ∆b
−2
10 each with two possibilities.
Furthermore, we guessed ∆R1−2 and ∆R1−1 each with 226 possibilities.
Since we have the constraint on ∆R1−2 with msb=smsb=0 and the con-
straint on ∆R1−1, we have to execute our attack 22 · 22 times (for example
with different ∆d) that these cases happen. The overall time complexity in
K2⊕ clocks is
2 · 2 · 226 · 226 · 22 · 22 · (30 + 210 + 7) ≈ 268.05 .
The needed keystream amounts to two words per clock for six clocks for each
pair (K, IVa) and (K, IVb) which yields 24 keystream words. The memory
requirements are roughly 30 words.
If we would restrict the difference ∆d to a word with three bytes equal
to zero and one non-zero byte, we would get a time complexity of
2 · 2 · 25 · 226 · 22 · 22 · (30 + 210 + 7) ≈ 247.05
K2⊕ clocks. The keystream and memory requirements remain.
The summary of our results is given in Table 6.5 with time in K2⊕ clocks
and keystream and memory in words. We were not able to extend this attack
to eight initialization clocks because we have not found a way to handle
the unknown differences from the NLF fed back into FSR−A and FSR−B.
Furthermore, non-zero differences in the bits of the DFC will occur which
makes the computation of the differences of FSR−B impossible.
differential chosen IV attack on K2⊕ keystream time memory
5 initialization clocks 28 210.05 30
6 initialization clocks 28 239.05 30
with restriction of ∆d to 1 byte 28 218.05 30
7 initialization clocks 24 268.05 30
with restriction of ∆d to 1 byte 24 247.05 30
Table 6.5: Summary of our results on K2⊕
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6.3 Chosen IV Distinguishing Attack
We now consider K2⊕ with the number of initialization clocks reduced to
seven. To distinguish the cipher from a random function, we build a multi-
set over all possible 232 values of one word using 232 different key-IV pairs
and check whether the XORed sum over all first keystream words zH0 is equal
to zero which holds with probability one. For a random function the proba-
bility is 2−32 that this sum is zero.
For all 232 key-IV pairs we take the same unknown key K. The four
words of the IV = [IV0, IV1, IV2, IV3] are loaded in the FSR−B, where the
word IV1 loaded in b3 takes the longest time until it enters the NLF. For
this word IV1 we make a multiset in a way that all values [0, 232 − 1] occur
exactly once. We emphasize that we need the multiset in ascending order
starting with zero. Then we know that all IV1 values in the first half have
msb equal to zero whereas all IV1 values in the second half have msb equal
to one. We will use this fact about the msb later. The multiset in IV1 yields
232 different IVs IV i = [IV0, i, IV2, IV3], i = 0, . . . , 232 − 1 with arbitrary
words IV(0,2,3). For each pair (K, IV i) we run the K2⊕ cipher with seven
initialization clocks and get the first keystream word izH0 .
Now we explain why the XORed sum over all keystream words is equal
to zero. Our goal is to prove the multiset propagation through K2⊕ as shown
in Table 6.6.
clock FSR-B FSR-A NLF
ini 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 4 3 2 1 0 L1 L2 R1 R2
0 Ms
1 Ms
2 Ms
3 Ms Ms
4 S0Ms Ms
5 S0 S0Ms MsMs M1
6 S0 S0 S0Ms S0MsMs ? M2
7 S0 S0 S0 S0Ms ? S0MsMs M3 ? ?
Table 6.6: Propagation of the multiset through K2⊕ during the seven ini-
tialization clocks
In this table we only show the multiset and its behavior. All values which
are the same in all 232 key-IV pairs are omitted (empty in the table). We put
the ’?’ for those sets we do not know anything about. With the symbol ’Ms’
we denote the multiset in the starting order. The symbols ’M1’, ’M2’ and
’M3’ denote different multisets. In each of them each value [0, 232−1] occurs
exactly once but we do not know in which order. Thus, also the XORed sums
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over these multisets are zero. The symbol ’S0’ denotes a multiset, where the
characteristic that each value [0, 232 − 1] occurs exactly once is lost, but the
feature that it sums up (XORed) to zero still remains. To prove this feature
for the ’S0’ multisets it is sufficient to consider the sets in bt10 and at4. The
update equation for the XORed sum over all ibt10 is
232−1∑
i=0
ibt10 =
232−1∑
i=0
(
imt−1smsb
i
bt−10 ⊕ ibt−11 ⊕ ibt−16 ⊕ imt−1msb
i
bt−18
⊕ ibt−110 ⊕ iL2t−1 ⊕ iL1t−1 ⊕ iat−10
)
. (6.1)
Here, the variable imt−1msb denotes the multiplier depending on the msb of
iat−12 . In particular,
imt−1msb = α3 if the msb of
iat−12 is equal to one and
imt−1msb = 1 otherwise. Likewise, the variable
imt−1smsb denotes the multiplier
depending on the smsb of iat−12 . In particular,
imt−1smsb = α1 if the smsb of
iat−12 is equal to one and
imt−1smsb = α2 otherwise. The update equation for
the XORed sum over all iat4 is
232−1∑
i=0
iat4 =
232−1∑
i=0
(
α0
iat−10 ⊕ iat−13
⊕ ibt−10 ⊕ iR2t−1 ⊕ iR1t−1 ⊕ iat−14
)
. (6.2)
From now on, we always mean XORed sum when we write sum or the sigma
sign.
For clock 1 and 2 our starting multiset is only shifted in the FSR−B. We
do not mention the shifts of a multiset in the next clocks anymore. At clock 3
we compute the sum over all ib310. We see from Table 6.6 that the choice
for the multipliers is constant due to the constant value of a22. Thus, we do
not know which multiplier is chosen but we know it is the same for all 232
key-IV pairs. Table 6.6 also shows that nearly all summands are constants,
too, which means their sums are zero. We omit all zero sums reducing (6.1)
to
232−1∑
i=0
ib310 =
232−1∑
i=0
ib21 =
232−1∑
i=0
ib03 =
232−1∑
i=0
i = 0 , (6.3)
because it is the sum of our starting multiset and therefore zero. For clock 4
the choice for the multipliers in (6.1) is constant as well. We leave all zero
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sums out (empty values in Table 6.6) and yield
232−1∑
i=0
ib410 = m
3
smsb
232−1∑
i=0
ib30 ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
ib310
= m3smsb
232−1∑
i=0
ib03 ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
ib03
= m3smsb
232−1∑
i=0
i ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
i = 0 (6.4)
due to (6.3). At this clock our starting multiset enters the FSR−A because
after omitting all zero sums (6.2) gives
232−1∑
i=0
ia44 =
232−1∑
i=0
ib30 =
232−1∑
i=0
ib03 =
232−1∑
i=0
i = 0 . (6.5)
Looking at clock 5 the choice for the multipliers is constant due to the
constant value of a42. Table 6.6 shows that nearly all sums are zero which
reduces (6.1) with (6.4) to
232−1∑
i=0
ib510 =
232−1∑
i=0
ib410 = 0 . (6.6)
For FSR−A we get from (6.2) and (6.5)
232−1∑
i=0
ia54 =
232−1∑
i=0
ia44 = 0 . (6.7)
At this clock our starting multiset also enters the NLF in word R1 yielding
with (6.3)
232−1∑
i=0
iR15 =
232−1∑
i=0
Sub
(
iL24 ⊕ ib49
)
=
232−1∑
i=0
Sub
(
iL24 ⊕ ib310
)
=
232−1∑
i=0
Sub
(
iL24 ⊕ i) = 0 (6.8)
due to the constant value of L24. Thus, the order of our starting multiset
is destroyed but the feature that each value [0, 232 − 1] occurs exactly once
remains which results in a zero sum.
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For clock 6 the choice for the multipliers in (6.1) is constant as well. Thus,
we can lower (6.1) with (6.3) and (6.6) to
232−1∑
i=0
ib610 = m
5
msb
232−1∑
i=0
ib58 ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
ib510
= m5msb
232−1∑
i=0
ib310 ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
ib510
= m5msb
232−1∑
i=0
i ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
ib510 = 0 . (6.9)
For FSR−A we can reduce (6.2) with (6.5), (6.8) and (6.7) to
232−1∑
i=0
ia64 =
232−1∑
i=0
ia53 ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
iR15 ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
ia54
=
232−1∑
i=0
ia44 ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
iR15 ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
ia54 = 0 . (6.10)
At this clock we have the first unknown set in the NLF because with (6.6)
and (6.4) we get
232−1∑
i=0
iR16 =
232−1∑
i=0
Sub
(
iL26 ⊕ ib69
)
=
232−1∑
i=0
Sub
(
iL26 ⊕ ib510
)
=
232−1∑
i=0
Sub
(
iL26 ⊕ m3smsbi ⊕ i
)
, (6.11)
where we do not know how the summands in the Sub function behave. There-
fore, we have no clue what outcome the entire sum might have. The word
R26 = Sub(R15) is a multiset, because R15 is a multiset, in which each value
[0, 232−1] occurs exactly once, and the Sub function preserves this property.
Thus, we do not know the order of R26 but we know that the sum is zero.
At clock 7 we see that we have only three zero sums in Table 6.6. This
reduces (6.1) to
232−1∑
i=0
ib710 =
232−1∑
i=0
im6smsb
i
b60 ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
im6msb
i
b68 ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
ib610 . (6.12)
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The first two summands depend on the value of a62. From the update equation
for a62 = a44 we know
232−1∑
i=0
ia44 =
232−1∑
i=0
(
α0
ia30 ⊕ ia33 ⊕ ib30 ⊕ iR23 ⊕ iR13 ⊕ ia34
)
.
The values for a33, a30, R23, R13 and a34 remain constant for all pairs. We
denote the sum of them with C = α0a30 ⊕ a33 ⊕ R23 ⊕ R13 ⊕ a34 which does
not depend on i and is unknown to us. With this simplification and (6.5),
we obtain
232−1∑
i=0
ia44 =
232−1∑
i=0
(
i⊕ C
)
. (6.13)
As a result of the multiset we know that in each bit of i, the number of ones
and zeros occurring is exactly 231 which is an even number. This means that
the smsb of a44 has 231 ones and 231 zeros. Taking this and the fact that the
value of b60 remains constant we obtain for the first summand of (6.12)
232−1∑
i=0
im6smsb
ib60 =
231−1∑
i=0
α1b
6
0 ⊕
231−1∑
i=0
α2b
6
0 = 0 . (6.14)
Altogether, (6.12) simplifies with (6.9) and (6.14) to
232−1∑
i=0
ib710 =
232−1∑
i=0
im6msb
ib68 =
232−1∑
i=0
im6msb
ib410 , (6.15)
where the choice of the multiplier depends on the msb of the value a62 = a44
and the value of b410 does not remain constant. At the beginning we empha-
sized the ascending order of our multiset. This means that the first half of
our multiset has msb zero and the second half has msb one. Accordingly,
the msb of all ia44 with i = 0, . . . , 231−1 is the msb of the unknown constant
C shown in (6.13), whereas the msb of all ia44 with i = 231, . . . , 232− 1 is the
opposite of the msb of the unknown constant C. Thus, we divided the sum
into a first and a second half. We need to check whether we can also divide
the set of ib410. From (6.4) we know
232−1∑
i=0
ib410 = m
3
smsb
232−1∑
i=0
i ⊕
232−1∑
i=0
i .
The choice of the multipliers is constant but unknown to us. We can divide
both sums into a first and a second half. Together with the two possibilities
of the msb of a44 (first half zero and second half one, or vice versa) we can
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compute two values for (6.15)
X1 =
m3smsb 231−1∑
i=0
i ⊕
231−1∑
i=0
i
 ⊕ α3
m3smsb 232−1∑
i=231
i ⊕
232−1∑
i=231
i

X2 = α3
m3smsb 231−1∑
i=0
i ⊕
231−1∑
i=0
i
 ⊕
m3smsb 232−1∑
i=231
i ⊕
232−1∑
i=231
i
 .
For the sums over exactly one ordered half of the multiset the property of
summing up to zero is preserved. Accordingly, the values X1 and X2 are
both zero which results in
232−1∑
i=0
ib710 = X1 = 0 or
232−1∑
i=0
ib710 = X2 = 0 . (6.16)
The unknown sum in R16 gives us an unknown sum in R27 = Sub(R16) and
an unknown sum in a74 due to (6.2). In R17 we get an unknown sum for a
similar reason as for R16 in (6.11). We also get a multiset in L17 due to
232−1∑
i=0
iL17 =
232−1∑
i=0
Sub
(
iR26 ⊕ ib64
)
= 0 , (6.17)
where ib64 remains constant for all i. Thus, we have a multiset in L17 in
which each value [0, 232 − 1] occurs exactly once, because the Sub function
preserves this feature of the multiset in R26. Consequently, we have proven
the assumed multiset propagation through K2⊕ in Table 6.6.
The keystream is produced at clock zero after the initialization. For the
internal states we write the number of the initialization clock as superscript.
We know about the sum of all words izH0
232−1∑
i=0
izH0 =
232−1∑
i=0
(
ib710 ⊕ iL27 ⊕ iL17 ⊕ ia70
)
.
For all 232 key-IV pairs the values for L27 and a70 remain constant for all
pairs meaning the sum over them is zero. The values iL17 form a multiset
which sums up to zero and (6.16) shows the zero sum for ib710. Thus, we have
232−1∑
i=0
izH0 = 0 . (6.18)
We have shown that we can distinguish the K2⊕ from a random function
with probability 1− 2−32. We need the first keystream word for all 232 pairs
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(key, IV i) with (i = 0, . . . , 232−1). The time complexity is 232 times an XOR
of a word which is roughly 227.6 clocks of K2⊕. The memory requirements
are negligible.
We have not found a way to extend this attack to eight initialization
clocks because in L18 we will get a set we do not know anything about
coming from R27 and therefore resulting in a random sum.
6.4 Summary
We have shown a differential chosen IV attack with key-recovery on K2⊕
with five, six and seven initialization clocks. The time complexities for the
three attacks are 210.05, 218.05 and 247.05 clocks of K2⊕. All three attacks
have the same memory requirements of 30 words. The attacks on five and
six clocks need 28 words of keystream, and for seven clocks 24 keystream
words are needed.
A chosen IV distinguishing attack on K2⊕ with seven initialization clocks
is also presented. With a multiset and its predictable propagation through
these seven clocks we can distinguish K2⊕ from a random function with a
probability of 1−2−32. The complexity for this attack is 227.6 clocks of K2⊕,
negligible memory requirements and needed keystream of 232 words.
We can only attack reduced versions of K2⊕ with seven initialization
clocks out of 24. Thus, the security margin is large enough and these attacks
do not pose a threat to the K2 stream cipher.
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Chapter 7
Cryptanalysis of the Shrinking
Generator with Linear
Initialization
The shrinking generator [CKM93] is a classic stream cipher construction that
is specified without any key loading or resynchronization mechanisms; the
initial state is considered to be the secret key. This is probably one of the
reasons why even though these schemes have been very intensively studied
in the academic literature they are not widely used in practice.
In this chapter we show that a linear initialization with known feed-
back polynomials results in a very weak cipher. This coincides with similar
findings for filter generators and combiners with memory [ALP04] and with
chosen IV attacks on irregularly clocked ciphers A5/1 [EJ03, BB05] and
DECT [NTW10] amongst others.
We assume that the attacker has access to output streams of multiple
states that are differentially related, i.e. not only does the attacker know the
output sequence (z0i ) for a secret initial state σ0 but also output sequences
(zji ) for states σj = σ0⊕∆j together with the corresponding differences ∆j .
This can occur if the internal state of the stream cipher is not only initialized
with a key but also with an initial value (IV) that is transmitted in clear,
an approach that is commonly used when the communication secured by the
stream cipher is packetized. Then the attacker can use the known differences
to determine the internal state and thus the secret key.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 7.1 we briefly describe the
shrinking generator. In Section 7.2 we show the known IV key-recovery at-
tack on the shrinking generator with linear initialization and known feedback
polynomials. The summary is given in Section 7.3.
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7.1 Description of the Shrinking Generator
The shrinking generator is a stream cipher construction proposed by Copper-
smith, Krawczyk and Mansour [CKM93] in 1993. Two LFSRs A and S are
used to generate a so-called “shrunken sequence” by conditionally emitting
the output bit of A only if the output bit of the selector S in a given clock
equals 1; if the output bit of S equals 0, no output is produced. The output
sequence of the shrinking generator will be denoted by (zi). We denote by
(si) the output sequence and by nS the length of LFSR S. Similarly, (ai)
denotes the output sequence and nA the length of LFSR A. For optimal se-
curity, gcd(nS , nA) = 1 should hold; in this case the period of the generator
is (2nA − 1) · 2nS−1.
clock i
LFSR A
LFSR S
ai
si
selection
rule
zj
Figure 7.1: Shrinking Generator
In the original description the initial state and sometimes the feedback
polynomials as well are assumed to be the secret key. The use of an IV is
not mentioned nor is a method for loading and / or initialization given.
We consider the shrinking generator with a linear key-IV setup and
known feedback polynomials. The shrinking generator is initialized with
a key K and an IV V by sequentially clocking the bits of K and V into both
LFSRs. We have no restriction whether the key or the IV is clocked into the
LFSRs first. After the key and IV loading a number of blank rounds can be
executed, i.e. the shrinking generator is clocked without producing output.
7.2 Known IV Key-Recovery Attack
In this section we demonstrate a known IV key-recovery attack against
the shrinking generator with a linear key-IV setup and known feedback
polynomials. The attacker has access to v different keystreams (zi)j with
j = 1, . . . , v which are produced by v ≥ 2 known IVs and always the same
secret key. Of course, the corresponding sequences (si)j and (ai)j produced
by the LFSRs S and A are unknown to the attacker.
We can compute all differences between the known IVs and denote their
amount with w =
∑v−1
i=1 i. With each IV difference we start the shrinking
generator to produce the difference sequences for the LFSRs S denoted with
∆(si)h and the difference sequences for the LFSRs A denoted with ∆(ai)h
where h = 1, . . . , w.
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We can determine the first nS output bits of the unknown sequences (si)j
sequentially bit by bit using the knowledge of ∆(si)h, ∆(ai)h and the differ-
ences in the given keystreams. This allows us to recover the initial states of
the corresponding LFSRs S. Subsequently, we can recover the initial state
of each LFSR A using only the corresponding LFSR S and the keystream.
With the recovered LFSR S we can assign the clock to each keystream bit
when it was produced by the LFSR A. This gives us a system of linear equa-
tions in the unknown bits of the initial state of LFSR A. We need nA bits
of the keystream to yield enough equations. This corresponds to 2nA clocks
because roughly half of the output bits of LFSR A are discarded. We solve
the system in O(n3A) time and O(n2A) memory complexity and yield the ini-
tial state of the LFSR A. Now we know the initial state of the LFSRs S and
A and therefore the secret key.
To determine the output bits of the unknown sequences (si)j we consider
each clock separately. At each clock t we compute all differences between the
first bits of the sequences (zi)j and denote them with ∆zh1 with h = 1, . . . , w.
Now we look at the ∆sht and can distinguish three cases where each case has
different probabilities.
The first case occurs when all ∆sht = 0 which means all unknown s
j
t
have the same value, either zero or one. For all h = 1, . . . , w we check
whether ∆aht = ∆zh1 . If at least one h exists with ∆aht 6= ∆zh1 then we
conclude that all unknown sjt must be zero because the differences in the
output of the LFSRs A do not match the differences in the keystream. If
all differences of the output and the keystream match we can not decide
whether this happens by coincidence or because all st = 1.
The second case occurs when v − 1 out of w of the ∆sht equal one
which means that one of the sjt has the opposite value than the other s
j
t .
We consider only these h for which ∆sht = 0 and check for these h whether
∆aht = ∆z
h
1 . If among these h at least one exists with ∆aht 6= ∆zh1 then we
conclude that the corresponding sjt must be zero because the differences in
the output of the LFSRs A do not match the differences in the keystream.
If all these differences match we can not decide whether this happens coin-
cidentally or because the corresponding st = 1.
The third case occurs when the ∆sht can be divided into three subsets.
The first subset contains ∆sht = 0 so that the corresponding s
j
t all have
the same value. The second subset contains ∆sht = 0 as well so that the
corresponding sjt all have the same value but this value is opposite to the
value of the sjt belonging to the first subset. Consequentially, the third
subset contains all ∆sht = 1. For the first and second subset we check the
corresponding ∆aht = ∆zh1 . If for one subset all differences match and for
the other subset at least one inequation occurs then we can determine that
all sjt belonging to the subset with the inequation must be zero and the
sjt belonging to the other subset are one. If all differences match we can
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not decide whether the sjt belonging to the first subset are zero and the s
j
t
belonging to the second subset are one or the other way around. It can also
happen that for both subsets at least one inequation occurs which means the
sjt belonging to the first subset must be zero as well as the s
j
t belonging to
the second subset. This is a contradiction because the ∆sht constitute that
not all sjt can have the same value. This contradiction can only appear if at
a previous clock u we had to guess sju equals zero or one. So we have the
possibility to detect wrong guesses. If we had no guess in all previous clocks
we will have a decision.
For two or three IVs we can not eliminate wrong guesses because the case
for a contradiction never occurs. The amount of IVs is too small to yield a
division into three subsets as needed for the third case.
At each clock t we can either decide which sjt is zero and which is one
or we can not decide and therefore have to guess which sjt equals zero or
one. If sjt = 1 the first bit of the corresponding keystream sequence (zi)j is
discarded and the next bit becomes the first one.
Table 7.1 shows the frequency of occurrence for the different cases for
two up to nine IVs. The variable v denotes the number of IVs, p the amount
of possibilities, g the guesses, d the decisions and c the contradictions. The
probability to have a contradiction is given by r. The last column itemizes as
subcategories the different cases with the division of the sjt into subsets. The
value m denotes how often this division can occur and “α |β” describes the
exact division of the sjt into subsets. Please note that α ≤ β and α+ β = v.
For example for six IVs shows “2 | 4” the division where two of the sjt have
the same value and the remaining four sjt have the same value but this one
is opposite to the value of the previous two. The first subcategory contains
the first case when all ∆sht = 0 thus all s
j
t have the same value which gives
the division “0 | v”. The second subcategory contains the second case when
one of the sjt has the opposite value than the other s
j
t yielding the division
“1 | v − 1”. The remaining subcategories contain the different possibilities
for the third case where each subset given by the division contains at least
two sjt .
The more IVs are provided the better the attack works due to the in-
creased probability for determining sjt and more cases to eliminate wrong
guesses by a contradiction. For an arbitrary amount v of IVs the value p can
be computed with p = 22(v−1). We were not able to find a single equation to
compute the sum d and c depending on the amount of IVs but a recursive
description for the separate entries in Table 7.1. For d and c as well as g
and m we define a new notation where the superscript gives the number of
IVs and the bottom index denotes the division of the sjt into subsets. For
example d31|2 = 2 is the number of decisions for three IVs in the second case
where one sjt has the opposite value than the other two.
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62
.3
%
1
/
12
7
/
0
2
/
12
6
/
0
2
/
64
/
62
2
/
36
/
90
2
/
28
/
98
··
·
1×
0
|9
9×
1
|8
36
×
2
|7
84
×
3
|6
12
6×
4
|5
9
21
6
51
1
18
,4
05
46
,6
20
71
.1
%
1
/
25
5
/
0
2
/
25
4
/
0
2
/
12
8
/
12
6
2
/
68
/
18
6
2
/
44
/
21
0
··
·
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. .
.
Table 7.1: Probability of contradictions
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For the multiplier m we have the following recursive equations:
for the first subcategory mv0|v = 1
for the first entry of the second subcategory m21|1 = 1
for all entries with α 6= β mvα|β = vα ·mv−1α−1|β
for all entries with α = β mvα|β =
v
2α ·mv−1α−1|β
The number of guesses g can easily be extracted from the table:
for the first subcategory gv0|v = 1
for all other entries gvα|β = 2
equation for the sum
∑
gvα|β = 2
v − 1
For the number of decisions d we have the following recursive equations:
for the first subcategory dv0|v = 2
v−1 − 1 =∑ gv−1α|β
for the second subcategory dv1|v−1 = 2
v−1 − 2 = 2 · dv−10|v−1
for all other entries dvα|β = 2
α−1 + dv−1α−1|β = 2
v−α−1 + dv−1α|β−1
For the number of contradictions c the recursive equations are:
for the first and second subcategory cv0|v = c
v
1|v−1 = 0
for the third subcategory cv2|v−2 = 2
v−2 − 2
for all other entries cvα|β =
2β−1−1
2β−2−1 · cv−1α−1|β
The sum for d and c can be computed with these equations.
To mount the known IV attack with two or three IVs is useless because
we would have to guess too many bits of the sequences (si)j . Even with
four IVs the probability of getting a guess with 23.4% is much higher than
the probability of getting a contradiction with 9.4% which results in an
exponential time complexity to determine the bits of the sequences (si)j .
For five IVs we have a probability of 23.4% to get a contradiction which is
nearly twice the probability of 12.1% to get a guess. Therefore, we conclude
that the time complexity to recover the bits of the sequences (si)j would be
in O(nS) if at least five IVs are provided.
We assume both LFSRs having nearly the same length. Then the over-
all time complexity for our attack is dominated by O(n3A) as well as the
memory requirements by O(n2A). The needed keystream is roughly 2nA bits
for each IV.
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Note on the Self-Shrinking Generator with Known Feedback
Polynomials
The self-shrinking generator was presented by Meier and Staffelbach [MS94]
in 1994. The generator uses only one LFSR L and is specified without any
key loading or resynchronization mechanisms. The initial state is considered
to be the secret key. The output bits of the LFSR are grouped to pairs
(li+1, li) where the bit li+1 decides whether the bit li is an output bit of the
self-shrinking generator or not. If li+1 = 1 the bit li is the output bit of the
self-shrinking generator. If li+1 = 0 the bit li is discarded.
We can determine the initial state of the self-shrinking generator in a sim-
ilar way as for the shrinking generator. By dividing the sequence produced
by the LFSR L into a “selector” sequence and a “non-shrunken” sequence, we
are in the same place as for the shrinking generator. We can recover the bits
of the “selector” sequence one by one. The keystream contains roughly half of
the bits of the “non-shrunken” sequence and with the recovered “selector” bits
we also know the clock for each bit. Altogether we can determine roughly
3
4 of the bits in the sequence produced by L. Therefore we need to know
the bits for 43nL clocks on average to yield a system of nL linear equations
in the unknown initial state variables. The time complexity to solve this
system is in O(n3L) and the memory requirements are in O(n2L). Compared
to these complexities the needed time and memory for the determination of
the “selector” bits are negligible. The needed keystream is roughly 13nL bits
for each IV.
7.3 Summary
In this chapter we described a known IV key-recovery attack on the shrinking
generator with known linear feedback polynomials and a linear key-IV setup.
Despite the irregular clocking we are able to break the cipher in O(n3A) time
complexity and O(n2A) memory requirements using at least five IVs. The
design of the self-shrinking generator is related to the design of the shrinking
generator. Therefore, this cipher can also be broken with at least five IVs.
The time complexities is in O(n3L) and the memory requirements are in
O(n2L).
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Even the most successful attacks started
with pointing out a small weakness.
based loosely on Confucius
This thesis presents cryptanalysis of several stream ciphers, especially
known or chosen IV key-recovery attacks against their initialization methods.
If the update of the internal state is the same during initialization and
keystream generation or if a cipher does not have an initialization method
then it is worth to consider a slide attack. We describe slid pairs for Salsa20
and Trivium. The special structure of their starting states limits the amount
of slid pairs so that the probability of getting such a slid pair by chance is
too small to pose a real threat on these ciphers.
For both SNOW ciphers the addition modulo 232 is replaced by an XOR
to retain only the FSM as a non-linear part. If this non-linear part has
no influence on the linear part during the initialization the construction is
vulnerable. When the FSM affects the LFSR we are able to attack roughly
half of the initialization clocks.
The K2 cipher has a new design aspect to increase non-linearity. The
feedback function of one FSR is dynamically chosen by the other FSR among
four different linear feedback functions. This makes differential cryptanalysis
even more difficult than only dealing with the non-linearity introduced by
the FSM. We are only able to attack seven out of 24 initialization clocks for
a version where all additions modulo 232 are replaced by XORs.
A rather old design is the shrinking generator where the output bit of
one LSFR decides whether the output bit of the second LFSR becomes the
keystream. This results in an irregularly clocked keystream sequence. We
consider known feedback polynomials and a linear initialization with an IV
and are able to break the shrinking generator despite the irregular clocking
using only a few known IVs.
Apart from the shrinking generator the analyzed stream ciphers are
rather recent designs. We point out some weaknesses but are not able to
break these ciphers. Time will tell whether they withstand cryptanalytic
attacks or get broken.
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Appendix A
Salsa20 System of Equations
for a Slid Pair
Word equations given by the equations S′ = F (S) and X ′ = F (X).
k′0 = k3 ⊕ ((σ0 + k5)≪ 7)
k′1 = c0 ⊕ ((k′0 + σ0)≪ 9)
k′2 = k5 ⊕ ((k′1 + k′0)≪ 13)
σ0 = σ0 ⊕ ((k′2 + k′1)≪ 18)
n′0 = c1 ⊕ ((σ1 + k0)≪ 7)
n′1 = k6 ⊕ ((n′0 + σ1)≪ 9)
k′3 = k0 ⊕ ((n′1 + n′0)≪ 13)
σ1 = σ1 ⊕ ((k′3 + n′1)≪ 18)
k′4 = k7 ⊕ ((σ2 + n0)≪ 7)
c′0 = k1 ⊕ ((k′4 + σ2)≪ 9)
c′1 = n0 ⊕ ((c′0 + k′4)≪ 13)
σ2 = σ2 ⊕ ((c′1 + c′0)≪ 18)
k′5 = k2 ⊕ ((σ3 + k4)≪ 7)
k′6 = n1 ⊕ ((k′5 + σ3)≪ 9)
k′7 = k4 ⊕ ((k′6 + k′5)≪ 13)
σ3 = σ3 ⊕ ((k′7 + k′6)≪ 18)
x′1 = x4 ⊕ ((x0 + x12)≪ 7)
x′2 = x8 ⊕ ((x′1 + x0)≪ 9)
x′3 = x12 ⊕ ((x′2 + x′1)≪ 13)
x′0 = x0 ⊕ ((x′3 + x′2)≪ 18)
x′6 = x9 ⊕ ((x5 + x1)≪ 7)
x′7 = x13 ⊕ ((x′6 + x5)≪ 9)
x′4 = x1 ⊕ ((x′7 + x′6)≪ 13)
x′5 = x5 ⊕ ((x′4 + x′7)≪ 18)
x′11 = x14 ⊕ ((x10 + x6)≪ 7)
x′8 = x2 ⊕ ((x′11 + x10)≪ 9)
x′9 = x6 ⊕ ((x′8 + x′11)≪ 13)
x′10 = x10 ⊕ ((x′9 + x′8)≪ 18)
x′12 = x3 ⊕ ((x15 + x11)≪ 7)
x′13 = x7 ⊕ ((x′12 + x15)≪ 9)
x′14 = x11 ⊕ ((x′13 + x′12)≪ 13)
x′15 = x15 ⊕ ((x′14 + x′13)≪ 18)
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Word equations given by the feedforward for the first keystream words and
for the second keystream words.
z0 = x0 + σ0
z1 = x1 + k0
z2 = x2 + k1
z3 = x3 + k2
z4 = x4 + k3
z5 = x5 + σ1
z6 = x6 + n0
z7 = x7 + n1
z8 = x8 + c0
z9 = x9 + c1
z10 = x10 + σ2
z11 = x11 + k4
z12 = x12 + k5
z13 = x13 + k6
z14 = x14 + k7
z15 = x15 + σ3
z′0 = x′0 + σ0
z′1 = x′1 + k′0
z′2 = x′2 + k′1
z′3 = x′3 + k′2
z′4 = x′4 + k′3
z′5 = x′5 + σ1
z′6 = x′6 + n′0
z′7 = x′7 + n′1
z′8 = x′8 + c′0
z′9 = x′9 + c′1
z′10 = x′10 + σ2
z′11 = x′11 + k′4
z′12 = x′12 + k′5
z′13 = x′13 + k′6
z′14 = x′14 + k′7
z′15 = x′15 + σ3
Appendix B
SNOW3G Simplify the
Equation with two S-boxes
We want to simplify the equation
out
∆ S2(∆k1)⊕
out
∆ S1(∆k2) = ∆k4 .
The main difficulty is that S1 and S2 use the same MixColumns matrix but
over two different fields GF (28). We start with rewriting this equation in
byte notation as
MC2 ·

out
∆ SQ(∆k
(0)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(1)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(2)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(3)
1 )
 ⊕ MC1 ·

out
∆ SR(∆k
(0)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(1)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(2)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(3)
2 )
 =

∆k(0)4
∆k(1)4
∆k(2)4
∆k(3)4
 .
Then multiplying this equation with the inverse matrix MC−11 , we get
MC−11 ·
MC2 ·

out
∆ SQ(∆k
(0)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(1)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(2)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(3)
1 )

 ⊕

out
∆ SR(∆k
(0)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(1)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(2)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(3)
2 )
 = MC−11 ·

∆k(0)4
∆k(1)4
∆k(2)4
∆k(3)4
.
If we expand the matrix multiplications and have a look at the byte
vectors it shows that the first entry of the first vector contains the byte
out
∆ SQ(∆k01) and a byte polynomial containing only the most significant
bits of all four values
out
∆ SQ. We denote this polynomial with pmsb0 . The
other three rows have similar structures but with different polynomials pmsbi
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(i = 1, 2, 3). Therefore, we can rewrite the equation to
out
∆ SR(∆k
(0)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(1)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(2)
2 )
out
∆ SR(∆k
(3)
2 )
 =

out
∆ SQ(∆k
(0)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(1)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(2)
1 )
out
∆ SQ(∆k
(3)
1 )
 ⊕

pmsb0
pmsb1
pmsb2
pmsb3
 ⊕ MC−11 ·

∆k(0)4
∆k(1)4
∆k(2)4
∆k(3)4
 .
By m0 we denote the most significant bit of the value
out
∆ SQ(∆k01) and
with m1 the most significant bit of the value
out
∆ SQ(∆k11) as well as m2 for
out
∆ SQ(∆k21) and m3 for
out
∆ SQ(∆k31). Then the polynomials pmsbi i = 0, . . . , 3
are
pmsb0 = (m1 ⊕m3)x7 + (m0 ⊕m1)x6 + (m2 ⊕m3)x5 + (m1 ⊕m2)x4
+ (m0 ⊕m2)x2 + (m1 ⊕m2)x+ (m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3)
pmsb1 = (m0 ⊕m2)x7 + (m1 ⊕m2)x6 + (m0 ⊕m3)x5 + (m2 ⊕m3)x4
+ (m1 ⊕m3)x2 + (m2 ⊕m3)x+ (m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3)
pmsb2 = (m1 ⊕m3)x7 + (m2 ⊕m3)x6 + (m0 ⊕m1)x5 + (m0 ⊕m3)x4
+ (m0 ⊕m2)x2 + (m0 ⊕m3)x+ (m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3)
pmsb3 = (m0 ⊕m2)x7 + (m0 ⊕m3)x6 + (m1 ⊕m2)x5 + (m0 ⊕m1)x4
+ (m1 ⊕m3)x2 + (m0 ⊕m1)x+ (m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3) .

